The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.003

Cited by 46 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…This approach is consistent with the "veil of uncertainty" concept, by which climate change agreements are more feasible when participants do not know its distributional consequences (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013). For instance, all countries might agree that the ranking of their emissions allocations should be coherent with the ranking of their initial claims.…”

mentioning

confidence: 55%

“…However, since CO 2 stock control is out of policy makers' influence, they have been proposed limits on the rate of emissions flow, such as Kyoto protocol. But, dealing with flows does not guarantee the solution to the problem, as the limited success of existing attempts of reaching global commitments shows, so humanity faces a public good dilemma and requires further cooperation (Vasconcelos et al, 2013, Beccherle and Tirole, 2011, Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013. Given the causality of economic growth on CO 2 emissions 3 , international income inequality plays a critical role in this scene: rich countries are responsible of the bulk of historical cumulative emissions, whereas developing countries feel punished for others' sins and reclaim their right to achieve greater income.…”

Section: The Problem Of Carbon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem

2016

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Despite global environmental governance has traditionally couched global warming in terms of annual CO 2 emissions (a flow), global mean temperature is actually determined by cumulative CO 2 emissions in the atmosphere (a stock). Thanks to advances of scientific community, nowadays it is possible to quantify the "global carbon budget", that is, the amount of available cumulative CO 2 emissions before crossing the 2 o C threshold (Meinshausen et al., 2009). The current approach proposes to analyze the allocation of such global carbon budget among countries as a classical conflicting claims problem (O'Neill, 1982). Based on some appealing principles, it is proposed an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget from 2000 to 2050 taking into account different environmental risk scenarios.

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confidence: 55%

Section: The Problem Of Carbon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem

2016

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“…E.g. Hoel and Schneider (1997) introduce transfer schemes in the coalition formation process, Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) study uncertainty and learning, and Pethig (2013, 2015) extend that model by competitive markets and international trade. This literature is quite pessimistic about large and deep stable climate coalitions and finds that whenever the gains from cooperation would be large stable coalitions achieve only little.…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits

Eichner

Pethig

2017

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…Barrett (2002) defines two general cases of "narrow but deep" and "broad but shallow" cooperation whereby a stable IEA is achieved with a few countries mitigating much or many countries mitigating little. Dellink and Finus (2012) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) allow for the formation of multiple, more homogeneous coalitions so that countries can find smaller coalitions that better align their interests and achieve broader mitigation through transfer payments. Asheim et al (2006) posit that more public goods could be provided by two regional coalitions of fewer participants than by one large agreement.…”

Section: The International Environmental Agreements Literature and Trmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 Differences across countries in estimated damages and discount rates limit cooperation and lower aggregate welfare benefits (Haag and Lagunoff 2007) or they reduce the size of the cooperating coalition (Hannesson 2010). On the other hand, heterogeneous damages can promote cooperation when heterogeneity allows for gains from trade and the use of transfer payments (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993;Barrett 2001;Asheim and Holtsmark 2009;Kolstad 2010;Dellink and Finus 2012;Finus and Pintassilgo 2013). For example, low-marginal damage or low-abatement cost countries could potentially receive transfer payments from high-damage, high-abatement cost countries to join collective efforts.…”

Section: The International Environmental Agreements Literature and Trmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations

Libecap

2014

Journal of Economic Literature

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Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively, whereas others are not? The transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis. This approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights. Leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so. The demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action. Property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use, assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments, and determining who will pay and who will receive them. Four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights: (i) scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs; (ii) varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations; (iii) asymmetric information; and (iv) the extent of compliance and new entry. These factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks, implement the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, execute the Montreal Protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer, set limits on harvest of highly-migratory ocean fish stocks, and control greenhouse gas emissions.

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The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements

Cited by 46 publications

References 48 publications

The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem

The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem

Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations

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