The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy

Maibom, Heidi L.

doi:10.4324/9781315282015

Cited by 75 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…A common distinction in the literature on the concept of empathy is the between cognitive empathy and affective empathy (Maibom, 2017a). Cognitive empathy can be defined as "…the capacity to understand another person's state of mind from her perspective" (Spaulding, 2017, p. 13).…”

Section: The Concept Of Empathymentioning

confidence: 99%

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

Matthiesen

Klitmøller

2019

Theory & Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is an often taken for granted notion in contemporary Western everyday life that there is an intimate connection between empathy and moral action. Yet in recent years, this connection has come under scrutiny. In this article, we first ask the question, what is empathy? A brief survey over the psychological and philosophical approaches to the notion of empathy shows that it remains a highly contested concept. The field has a propensity to discuss empathy within the frame of sameness. We instead argue that in order to grasp empathy it is necessary to foreground otherness. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, we further argue, that when encountering the stranger, moral action requires both visiting the other -as distinct from empathic knowledge as well as thinking in order to judge what is right. Ultimately moral dilemmas are solved, not by having or demanding empathy, but by addressing the issues at hand in joint action.Any justification ends finally with the rationally gratuitous presence of the emotion of sympathy: if that condition were not met, one would simply have no reason to be moral.(Thomas Nagel, cited in Denham, 2017 p. 227).

show abstract

Section: The Concept Of Empathymentioning

confidence: 99%

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

Matthiesen

Klitmøller

2019

Theory & Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Gallese 2001), there has been much debate on the nature and function of empathy. For the sake of a better understanding, in this introduction we will use an operative definition of empathy (for an overview, see Batson 2009;Coplan 2004;Maibom 2017), according to which empathy, broadly construed, is the apprehension and understanding of others' mental states such as emotions, beliefs, and desires.…”

Section: Research Background and Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the main critiques leveled against these Theory of Mind approaches (TT and ST) is that they both have an overly narrow, occlusionistic view of the human mind, that is to say, they assume that the human mind is impassable for observers. Indeed, TT and ST agree that there is no immediate and direct apprehension of the other, since this is always mediated by a theory or by an imaginative process in which the empathizer uses her own mind as a model to then infer from herself to the other person's state (for an overview of these different approaches, see: Hagener and Vendrell Ferran 2017; Maibom 2017). Consider, first, the TT approach: This theory claims that from a third-person perspective or mere observational point of view, we deduce from another person's behavior and on the basis of some folk psychological insights that the other is in a specific mental state.…”

Section: Research Background and Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Empathy, Fiction, and Imagination

Schmetkamp¹,

Ferran

2019

Topoi

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In contemporary discourses, it has become common sense to acknowledge that humans and some species of animals, from their very inception, are embedded in social and intersubjective contexts. As social beings, we live, interact, communicate, and cooperate with others for a range of different reasons: sometimes we do so for strategic and instrumental reasons, while at other times it is purely for its own sake. Moreover, in one way or another, we encounter others not only as rational but also as sentient beings; our interactions with others are shaped by reason, though not exclusively so. They are also affected by our emotions, feelings, moods, and environments. In this way, we seek understanding both for and by others. We are able to recognize, interpret, and categorize others' expression and behavior; in turn, we express our emotions, desires, and motivations to act towards others and hope that others will react adequately and appropriately.Empathy is usually understood as the capacity to apprehend others' mental states-especially emotions. In recent decades, it has become one of the most widely discussed concepts, especially in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. Although there is a vast array of publications on the topic of empathy, a number of controversies have persisted, particularly in relation to how the process, outcome, and value of empathy should be understood. One recent debate concerns the question of whether we directly perceive others' mental states or whether we rather imagine their perspective. Another central discussion is ongoing regarding empathy in respect of narratives and fictional characters.The aim of this Special Issue is to interrelate these two branches-fiction and imagination-and to examine the role of imagination in the empathic process, especially in relation to the thesis of direct perception of others' mental states. Despite the wealth of recent research into empathy that has emerged from a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives, there is still no consensus about the nature and role of imagination and whether empathizing with fictions should be categorically or just gradually distinguished from empathizing with real persons.

show abstract

“…Defining empathy is not a straightforward task, due to the different ways this construct is conceptualised by researchers (Davis, 2004). Discussions around empathy typically begin with the differentiation between cognitive empathy (being a person's ability or capacity to understand what another person is feeling or experiencing) and affective empathy (which denotes a person's emotional response to another's feelings or circumstances) (Maibom, 2017). Although some academics do not agree that empathy constitutes an emotion in its own right (see, for example, Prinz, 2011), others are more accepting of affective empathy as "an emotional response to the situation of another that reflects a first-person stance towards that situation" (Maibom, 2017, p. 23).…”

Section: Empathy: Compassionate Women and Caring Fathersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although related, it is important to distinguish feelings of empathy from feelings of sympathy (or what psychologists refer to as 'empathic concern') (Maibom, 2017). For empathy, the feelings experienced by an observer will typically match those experienced by the other person or what they might reasonably be expected to feel in that circumstance (Maibom, 2017). On the other hand, feelings of sympathy typically encapsulate a narrower range of emotions, including concern and feelings of tenderness (Maibom, 2017).…”

Section: Empathy: Compassionate Women and Caring Fathersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gendered views on parole: exploring how emotion and emotion management help to explain gender differences in the Australian public’s views on parole

Dodd¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy

Cited by 75 publications

References 0 publications

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as a moral compass

Introduction: Empathy, Fiction, and Imagination

Gendered views on parole: exploring how emotion and emotion management help to explain gender differences in the Australian public’s views on parole

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About