The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Chiao, Benjamin; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean

doi:10.3386/w11156

Cited by 46 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Chiao et al [2007] have identified 59 SSOs operating in that arena, and they do not claim to have found them all. As of 2001, the IEEE-SA alone had 866 active standards and 526 projects in hand, with over 450 technical working groups and committees.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

Schmalensee

2009

SSRN Journal

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Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standardsetting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.

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confidence: 99%

Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

Schmalensee

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) report that in their sample of standard-setting organizations, 34 percent use majority rule, 27 percent use super-majority rules, and 13 percent use consensus to adopt standards. Our results suggest that there is no single decision rule that suits all standard-setting organizations.…”

Section: Standard-setting Committeesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberating Collective Decisions

Chan

Lizzeri

Suen

et al. 2017

The Review of Economic Studies

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Abstract:We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and match an array of stylized facts on committee decision making. First, majority rule is more fragile than super-majority rules to the disproportionate influence of impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more patient members, or more unanimous decision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Last, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a rule such as unanimity.JEL Classification: D71, D72, D83

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“…For example, Chiao et al state that, "[a] standard that demands backwards compatibility can ensure ongoing revenues for a legacy product for many years" ( [43], p. 139). Other expected benefits of standards are also mentioned, notably the relationship between standards and innovation:…”

Section: Economics Of Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From laissez-faire to intervention: Analysing policy narratives on interoperability standards for the smart grid in the United States

Muto

2017

Energy Research & Social Science

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A B S T R A C TThe imperative of realizing utopian visions of the smart grid puts unprecedented policy focus on standardization. Because standards are a prerequisite for deployment, the US federal government -in a departure from established hands-off practice -intervened to coordinate and accelerate standardization activities. This research uses narrative analysis to explore how such a policy of intervention was constructed. What emerges has elements of a hero story, describing a situation to be remedied: an aging electricity grid, plagued by blackouts and modernization hampered by an electric utility industry composed by stand-alone "silos". In contrast, the vision of a future "smart grid" with promises of improved energy security, reduced carbon emissions, renewable resources, "green innovation" and jobs. The threat: without standards, the risk that sizable public investments become obsolete prematurely. The villain: unnamed companies engaging in uncompetitive behavior. The unlikely hero: The National Institute of Standards and Technology, able to act as an "honest broker", proving that the government can as "catalyst" in partnership with industry. While succeeding in making a strong argument for government intervention, the story can be criticized for making exaggerated claims about the effects of standards, for downplaying the complexity of the process and for failure to outline policy alternatives beyond a fiveyear plan.

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The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Cited by 46 publications

References 15 publications

Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

Deliberating Collective Decisions

From laissez-faire to intervention: Analysing policy narratives on interoperability standards for the smart grid in the United States

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