This chapter defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow. 1. Introduction A realist portrayal of science should accommodate the fact that science describes the world from numerous 'perspectives'. The nature of these perspectives and their interrelationships have for long been the bread and butter of history and philosophy of science. Realists continue grappling with challenges arising from the contingencies of grand theoretical perspectives (or 'paradigms') and the ever-increasing plurality of models used for predicting and explaining various phenomena. These challenges turn on the inconsistencies that science seems to harbor, threatening the realist credo that science successfully works by virtue of 'getting things right about the world'. A natural realist hope is that these inconsistencies can be accommodated through an apt notion of 'perspective', which is compatible with the basic realist credo. What notion of 'scientific perspective' should realism incorporate then? Answering this question helps with understanding scientific realism, and it is further instigated by recently developed perspectivist foils to more traditional realism by Ronald Giere, Paul Teller, and Michela Massimi. 3 These self-proclaimed 'perspectival realists' have developed and defended views about the perspectival nature of scientific knowledge that put emphasis on it "being situated" in historical and modelling contexts (Massimi 2018b, 164). Thus, perspectivists characterize scientific knowledge as "the inevitable product of the historical period to which those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and scientific theories belong," and as being embedded in "a prevailing cultural tradition in which those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and scientific theories were formulated." (ibid.) I am doubtful that realist's optimism and commitment towards scientific progress and theorizing (especially in the fundamental sciences) are best captured in terms of scientific knowledge. Articulating a different vision for realism is a book-length project. The limited aim of this chapter is to present an alternative, realist-friendly notion of scientific perspective that does not concern knowledge. In particular, I wish to focus on (what I call) 'explanatory perspectives' in relation to a (minimally) realist commitment to accumulating scientific understanding. Shifting the 1 Forthcoming in M. Massimi and C.D. McCoy (eds.), Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects, Routledge. 2 I would like to thank Callum Duguid, Steven French, Kareem Khalifa, Rob Knowles, Michela Massimi, and Alice Murphy for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.