The scope of inductive risk

Magnus, P. D.

doi:10.1111/meta.12536

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…The way researchers balance the risk of false positives against the risk of false negatives commonly manifests in the threshold for statistical significance (i.e., a p-value < 0.05) that they set for their results and that thus specifies what counts as sufficient evidence for accepting a claim (Magnus, 2022). Different consciousness researchers deal differently with this threshold, leading in some cases to disagreements (Birch, 2023).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do current evidential standards in the science of consciousness help or hinder the discovery of signs of consciousness?

Peters

2023

Preprint

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One recent approach to determining whether comatose patients, non-human animals, or brain organoids are conscious is to examine whether they display features that scientific studies have found to be correlated with and indicative of consciousness. However, it is unclear to what extent scientific studies that search for such signs of consciousness rely on evidential standards that facilitate the detection of these features. Here, I argue that when it comes to standards of statistical significance, many of the studies at issue rest on a value judgment according to which false positive research conclusions are much more problematic than false negative ones. This value judgment contradicts a common normative intuition that many consciousness researchers have and may impede the discovery of signs of consciousness. Moreover, recent efforts to reduce replication failures of scientific studies by lowering the threshold for statistical significance may further increase the risk of consciousness researchers to miss evidence of consciousness in organic or artificial systems. I argue that these limitations provide reasons to shift from the conventional statistical significance thresholds in experimental consciousness research to Bayes Factors.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do current evidential standards in the science of consciousness help or hinder the discovery of signs of consciousness?

Peters

2023

Preprint

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Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk

Hoyningen‐Huene

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.

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The scope of inductive risk

Cited by 2 publications

References 14 publications

Do current evidential standards in the science of consciousness help or hinder the discovery of signs of consciousness?

Do current evidential standards in the science of consciousness help or hinder the discovery of signs of consciousness?

Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk

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