The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

This article argues that a decade after the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe, the establishment of democratic civil-military relations has moved on from first generation issues of institutional restructuring to second generation challenges relating to the democratic consolidation of these relationships. In practice, these have more to do with issues of state capacity-building and bureaucratic modernization with the traditional concerns of the civil-military relations literature. In most cases, the problem is not the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces or the separation of the military from politics, but rather that of the effective execution of democratic governance of the defense and security sector-particularly in relation to defense policy-making, legislative oversight and the effective engagement of civil-society in a framework of democratic legitimacy and accountability.

Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in a Pakistan: Some Lessons from Turkey

“…They embark on an ambitious economic and political agenda and when they handover power, they maintain the status of praetorian moderates, keeping watchful eye on the civilian government. In an another discourse on democratizing civil-military relations in Eastern European countries, Andrew Cottey suggests in his article "second generation problematics" that after the fall of communism, the East European states have formalized first generation reforms, while there is need for a second generation reforms for civilian governance of defence and security sector [4]. The first generation of reforms include the institutional and legal reforms to bring military under the control of civil executives, while the secondgeneration reforms are the practical manifestation by state capacity building.…”

Theorizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies: agency, structure and institutional change

“…Civilian control over this area can be gauged by analyzing to which degree civilians can effectively devise and decide on defense policy; and to which extent they are able to effectively oversee the military's implementation of defense policies. e) the area of Military Organization comprises decisions regarding all organizational aspects of the military institution, including the "hardware", i.e., the military's institutional, financial and technological resources, and the "software" of military organization, for instance decisions on military doctrine, education, and personnel selection (Bland 2001;Cottey et al 2002a). Measures of civilian control over this area are the extent of civilians' authority to decide on the "hardware" and "software" of military organization, and the degree to which civilians can establish the boundaries of military autonomy in deciding on these military-internal affairs.…”

“…furthermore, civilian groups alienated from the democratic process might attempt to realize their policy preferences by strengthening the veto power of like-minded military officers. Generally, however, in democratic transitions civilians will focus primarily on gaining control over 'elite recruitment' and 'public policy' instead of the more peripheral areas pertaining to security and defense matters (for a similar conclusion see Cottey et al 2002a).…”

“…Instead, they will have to rely on weaker approaches to make the military yield to the new rules (cf. Agüero 1995Agüero , 1998Cottey et al 2002a). …”

The Phantom of the Good Soldier Švejk in the Czech Army Accession to NATO (2001–2002)

“…According to this new rationality, the larger apparatus of power that Deleuze and Guattari call the war machine is to assume a different and more prominent position vis-à-vis the state and society (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). In the post-communist Czech context, this repositioning of the war machine was instigated and assisted by the regional processes of democratization and NATO integration, which have exerted pressures on the Czech state to launch effective reforms in the military and the security sector (Cottey et al 2002;Gabal 2001Gabal , 2002Gabal et al 2002;Šedivý 1999;Simon 1999;Spurný 1998Spurný , 2001Ulrich 1999Ulrich , 2002Žantovský 1999). Using "professionalization" as a powerful signifier, a trendy catchword, the Czech state sought to modernize a technologically obsolete post-Soviet military institution and at the same time to convince Czech society to replace its culturally entrenched, generally skeptical attitude toward things military with a new respect and seriousness (Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 2002a, b, c; Simon 1985).…”