The security of energy infrastructure and supply in North Africa: Hydrocarbons and renewable energies in comparative perspective

Fostering Interdependence to Minimise Political Risks in a European-North African Renewable Electricity Supergrid

“…Hence, the impacts of a politically motivated electricity export disruption are more direct -they start at the instant the disruption begins -and affect both the importer and the exporter stronger than a similar event in the gas or oil supply system. Therefore, analogies to geopolitical risks in the gas and oil systems may be incorrect (see also [17]), as the systems are different.…”

“…So far, much of the Supergrid discussion has viewed the exports as bulk transfer of dedicated export electricity, distinct from the general electricity supply framework [22]. This is a main source for the worries about political extortion risks: bulk point-to-point transfer is easy to understand, and lends itself very well to power considerations and analogies to pipeline gas import vulnerabilities [17]. If, however, the electricity is allowed to flow freely in a meshed system on an open European-North African market with common rules and institutions, the situation is completely different: it would be physically much more difficult (or impossible) to cut supply to a particular country, and the legal and practical possibilities of exporter governments to access energy trade as a forceful foreign policy instrument are reduced.…”

Renewable Energy in the Context of Sustainable Development

“…The impact of induced seismicity from enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) has already been the cause of delays, and two major EGS projects in the USA and Switzerland were even permanently abandoned (Majer et al, 2007;Dannwolf and Ulmer, 2009). With the accelerating expansion of offshore wind parks, the risk analysis of ship collisions with offshore wind turbines and the subsequent implementation of riskreducing measures becomes an import aspect; although the frequency of occurrence is low, the consequences could be large (Christensen et al, 2001;Biehl and Lehmann, 2006 installation of large renewable capacities in geopolitically less stable regions, threats to RE infrastructure (including the grid) and supply may become an important factor, including intentional supply cuts as well as physical or cyber attacks by non-state actors (e.g., sabotage, terrorism) (Lacher and Kumetat, 2010). Key issues for bioenergy include potential competition with food production and use of water resources (e.g., Koh and Ghazoul, 2008; see Sections 2.5.7.4 and 9.3.4.4).…”

“…Despite numerous prototype installations and a few small commercial projects, tidal and wave power technologies are still at a relatively early stage of development, therefore their potential impacts and risks are yet rather poorly understood (Westwood, 2007;Güney and Kaygusuz, 2010;Langhamer et al, 2010;Shields et al, 2011). Coq and Paltseva, 2009;Giroux, 2010;Toft et al, 2010;Lacher and Kumetat, 2010). Pirate attacks on oil/gas tankers (Hastings, 2009;Hong and Ng, 2010).…”

The 2011 MENA Revolutions: A Study in U.S. Energy (In) Security

“…29 The North African region alone holds approximately 4.5% of the world's oil and 4.4% of the world's proven gas reserves. 30 Although the U.S. procures a greater amount of its oil from Canada than from anywhere else, disruptions in the MENA both directly and indirectly affect U.S. oil import capabilities. Direct effects include increased competition with Europe (the largest hydrocarbon importer from the MENA area) for MENA resources, while indirect effects include the destabilization of global hydrocarbon markets (e.g., through speculation).…”