The Seductions of Clarity

Nguyen, C. Thi

doi:10.1017/s1358246121000035

Cited by 41 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…The generative potential of conspiracy ideas, also called their cognitive fertility (Thi Nguyen, 2021), is a central subjective marker that we have understood something. Again, it implies that understanding is not about passively absorbing information, but about active and creative (re)construction of information (Elgin, 2002;Thi Nguyen, 2021). Being able to construct your own "pieces of knowledge" using a self-devised variation of the conspiracy theory, seems to be a key mechanism in the adoption of conspiracy theories (Brashier, 2022;Garry et al, 2021).…”

Section: Ahas As Tools In Conspiracy Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Insight in the conspiracist’s mind

Cruys¹,

Bervoets²,

Gadsby³

et al. 2023

Preprint

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The motto of the conspiracist, “Do your own research,” may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities (“research”) that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or “aha” experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

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Section: Ahas As Tools In Conspiracy Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Insight in the conspiracist’s mind

Cruys¹,

Bervoets²,

Gadsby³

et al. 2023

Preprint

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show abstract

“…However, as is well documented (Merry, 2016; Nguyen, 2021a; Scott, 1998), these instruments only work when the social realities they measure are modified to suit their measurement. As our societies evolve to become more dependent on technologies and more global, the increased epistemic powers of human beings are predicated on the scaffolding of their abilities within engineered niches which, because they rely on standardisation and simplification, might obstruct our understanding of other aspects of social reality.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffolding knowledge

Tanesini

2022

Philosophical Issues

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In this article I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to improve upon them to the advantage of their descendants. Finally, I highlight that the growth of human epistemic achievements is often due to increased outsourcing of cognitive effort and epistemic powers onto impersonal physical and social structures so that human beings can succeed more by contributing less to the solution of problems.Reality is messy. Other people can be hard to fathom. A striking feature of the way in which human beings figure things out is their tendency to manipulate their physical and social surroundings to facilitate the task of finding answers to their questions. Nowhere is this phenomenon more apparent than in laboratory science (Hacking, 1992). Experimental scientific research always requires creating the kind of laboratory conditions that "clean up" reality by screening off external influences and other kinds of confounders, and by making simplifying assumptions. In short, reality must be shaped, changed, and manipulated to be amenable to being known in the ways that are characteristic of Western experimental science. Further, if that knowledge is to be useful outside the confines of the laboratory, our everyday surroundings need to be modified so as to resemble in the relevant aspects the laboratory conditions (Rouse, 1987). Thus, for example, the advances This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

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“…We can then gain, not only an internal clarity purpose, but an external clarity of expression. It becomes effortless to justify ourselves to others, when we have all converged on the same value standard (Nguyen, 2020a, 189‐215; 2021a; 2021b). These explanations work for any sort of metric or gamification, not just the ones created for transparency.…”

Section: Epistemic Intrusivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transparency is Surveillance

Nguyen

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

Self Cite

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In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O'Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency -that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to nonexperts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption -but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual's capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust -if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public -then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise.In her 2002 BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O'Neill offers a biting criticism of one of the ethical presumptions of modern life. People think that trust and transparency go together, says O'Neill. And they think that transparency is wholly good. But actually, she says, trust and transparency are deeply opposed.

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The Seductions of Clarity

Cited by 41 publications

References 40 publications

Insight in the conspiracist’s mind

Insight in the conspiracist’s mind

Scaffolding knowledge

Transparency is Surveillance

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