We investigated the perception of higher-order interpersonal affordances for kicking that emerged from lower-order personal and interpersonal affordances in the context of soccer. Youth soccer players reported the minimum gap width between two confederates through which they could kick a ball. In Experiment 1, we independently manipulated the egocentric distance of gaps from participants, and the nominal role of the confederates, either as teammates or opponents. In Experiment 2, we additionally varied the direction in which the confederates were facing, either together (i.e., into the gap) or away (i.e., away from the gap). Perceived minimum kickable gap width was larger for farther egocentric distances, when confederates were identified as opponents rather than as teammates, and (in Experiment 2) when confederates faced toward, rather than away from the gap. In both experiments, these main effects were subsumed in statistically significant interactions. We argue that these interactions reveal perception of higher-order interpersonal affordances for kicking that emerged from the simultaneous influence of lower-order affordances. The results are compatible with the hypothesis that these higher-order affordances were perceived, as such, and were not additively combined from independent perception of underlying, lower-order affordances.
Public Significance StatementPerception of action possibilities informs everyday action, such as deciding whether we can kick the ball between two players in a soccer game. This study demonstrated that young soccer players can directly apprehend how their kicking ability is simultaneously influenced by different kinds of factors, and that they do not have to "figure out" how the different factors relate to each other. This is evidence of a fundamental unity between perception and cognition.