The selective centralization in decentralization: China’s environmental vertical management reform with a case study in Hebei province

Abstract

This article examines why and how China's environmental vertical management reform has been carried out and how well it helps to improve the implementation of local policies. By applying the theoretical framework of 'dynamics, strategy, and capacities' in Hebei province as a case, the changes in the policy process have been fully revealed. The article concludes that the reform shows the character of selective centralization in decentralization, which facilitates the establishment of a degree of standardization in policy implementation. However, a new phenomenon of 'selective implementation' has been spotted which severely distorts the actual results of this reform.

Decentralization for Increased Sustainability in Natural Resource Management? Two Cautionary Cases from Ghana

“…Since 2006, attempts by central government authorities seem to roll back local people's participation and control of mineral resource exploitation amidst Act 462. The empirical case study results show that central government authorities implemented selective decentralization on grounds of so-called sustainable management, contrary to observations in other sectors, such as local governance [40], education [41], sustainable urban development [42], and environmental management [43]. In the Ghanaian case of NRM for ASM, selective decentralization only worked in limited sustainable management practices at local levels.…”

Optimal Mobilization Development Strategy Searching and the Crisis of the Soviet Economic School on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War

“…Let us recall in this regard that there was a lack of domestic cars at the front several months later! There were also problems with the planning of the production of ammunition: control figures for 1941 at Sverdlov plant were launched on February 4, and the approved plan was sent on May 15 (Xu, 2021). He expressed bewilderment that the engineers wore out the seats of their pants in the offices.…”

Improving connectivity in water governance: the implementation of water cooperation mechanisms in disparate political and social contexts

“…China offers another important empirical context in this special issue. From the perspective of institutional arrangement, Xu (2021) examines the implementation of China's water governance reform that aims to rebalance central-local relations and improve water quality. In response to problems of fragmentation caused by weak enforcement, bargaining and local opportunism (Marks, 2010;Ran, 2013Ran, , 2017, China's central government initiated a national 'vertical reform' programme in the water sector in 2016.…”

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