The self-organizing consciousness

Perruchet, Pierre; Vinter, Annie

doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000067

Cited by 187 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 311 publications

(337 reference statements)

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“…At the extremes, totally implicit knowledge, like procedural knowledge, is completely specific to a given situation, whereas totally explicit knowledge could be transferred to representations in the lexical system-meaning that it could be verbalized (Dienes & Perner, 1999). In a complementary fashion, Perruchet and Vinter (2002) claimed that transfer of knowledge from the original situation (i.e., learning) to another situation (i.e., generation task) is possible only when the elements that are common to both situations (i.e., the task sequence) are conscious. In that sense, the lack of transfer to the generation task in Experiment 2 implies that the gained knowledge was implicit.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonintentional task set activation: Evidence from implicit task sequence learning

Gotler

Meiran

Tzelgov

2003

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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Studies have shown that task sets could be configured endogenously (i.e., on the basis of memory) according to an explicit sequence or exogenously according to a task cue. In two experiments, we examined whether an implicitly learned sequence could facilitate task set configuration without participants' intention. These experiments led to opposite conclusions regarding this question, but their methodology made it impossible to distinguish between the interpretations. We alteredthe task-switching paradigm by embedding a hidden task sequence, while randomizing all other aspects, including perceptual (i.e., task cues) and motor elements. We found that a sequence of tasks, proper, was learned implicitly and that the memory of that sequence endogenously facilitatedtask decision processes without the participants' explicit knowledge.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonintentional task set activation: Evidence from implicit task sequence learning

Gotler

Meiran

Tzelgov

2003

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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“…Given the continual ebb and flow of evidence for and against unconscious perception, one may question whether conclusive results will ever be possible. A very similar controversy has played out in the literature regarding unconscious learning (Dulany, 1997;Perruchet & Vinter, 2002;Shanks & St. John, 1994). Part of the problem may result from the attempt to specify the nature of internal processing from behavioral data (especially for very subtle, complex distinctions, and especially from global indicators such as d′).…”

Section: A Concluding Caveatmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…They concluded that consciousness is epiphenomenal, merely providing the results of processing that has already been carried out to the highest causal levels. If, on the contrary, conscious processes are capable of overriding unconscious influences until the point where d′ ϭ 0, then consciousness appears to have a strong causal role (Dulany, 1997;Perruchet & Vinter, 2002), one that is perhaps stronger than presently recognized. That is, conscious processes are operating below the subjective threshold (cf.…”

Section: Implications For Theories Of Conscious/unconscious Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Valid distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception?

Haase

Fisk

2004

Perception & Psychophysics

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“…First, critical reviews (e.g., Dulany 1997;Perruchet & Vinter 2002;Shanks & St. John 1994) find no defensible evidence for use of unconscious rules in learned categorization. Second, according to a view recently elaborated (e.g., Dulany 1997;Perruchet & Vinter 2002), automatic categorization occurs with direct activation of an awareness of kind from awareness of features or form. With automatization, category representations should drop out, not down to an unconscious level -a view consistent with accumulating evidence for diminishing fMRI activation in relevant networks during automatization (e.g., Schneider et al 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two types of thought: Evidence from aphasia

Davidoff

2005

Behav Brain Sci

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Abstract:The distinction between rules and similarity is central to our understanding of much of cognitive psychology. Two aspects of existing research have motivated the present work. First, in different cognitive psychology areas we typically see different conceptions of rules and similarity; for example, rules in language appear to be of a different kind compared to rules in categorization. Second, rules processes are typically modeled as separate from similarity ones; for example, in a learning experiment, rules and similarity influences would be described on the basis of separate models. In the present article, I assume that the rules versus similarity distinction can be understood in the same way in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and that a unified model for rules and similarity is appropriate. A rules process is considered to be a similarity one where only a single or a small subset of an object's properties are involved. Hence, rules and overall similarity operations are extremes in a single continuum of similarity operations. It is argued that this viewpoint allows adequate coverage of theory and empirical findings in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and also a reassessment of the objectives in research on rules versus similarity.Keywords: categorization; cognitive explanation; language; learning; reasoning; rules; similarity Emmanuel Pothos received his D.Phil. in Experimental Psychology from the University of Oxford in 1998. Since then he has been a lecturer of psychology at the University of Wales at Bangor and at the University of Edinburgh; he is currently at the University of Crete. His research activity includes computational models in unsupervised categorization and statistical methods for disambiguating rules and similarity in learning. Additionally, he is looking at applications of learning models in the study of addictive behavior. A focal point of his work is the a priori comparability of theoretical accounts and explanatory concepts in cognitive psychology.partly because they uniquely have in common a particular set of properties or features, as research in basic level categorization and spontaneous classification shows (Pothos & Chater 2002;Rosch & Mervis 1975). I postulate that the object properties relevant in deciding how to categorize it amongst a number of candidate categories are the properties uniquely common to the instances of each category (cf. Aha & Goldstone 1992). For example, in order to decide whether my car keys are a member of the category 'things to take out of my house when it is on fire," I will have to consider only whether car keys match the uniquely common properties of the other members of that category ("credit cards," "my cat," "my university diploma") (Barsalou 1991). Note that the present proposal does not involve any commitment about the form of features or properties (cf. Marr 1982). We simply require that at some level it is possible to represent objects in terms of discrete entities (perceptual features, abstract proper...

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The self-organizing consciousness

Cited by 187 publications

References 311 publications

Nonintentional task set activation: Evidence from implicit task sequence learning

Nonintentional task set activation: Evidence from implicit task sequence learning

Valid distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception?

Two types of thought: Evidence from aphasia

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