1944
DOI: 10.2307/2102968
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The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics

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Cited by 1,302 publications
(361 citation statements)
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“…21 In conclusion, the knowledge operator K is a truth operator, and of course this operator does not satisfy the principle of bivalence. Concluding, it is true both (i) that the validity of the (T) schema expresses our essential intuition about the notion of truth, and (ii) that our most common intuitive notion of truth is realistic; but the reason why (ii) holds is bivalence, not the (T) schema: the validity of the (T) schema is neutral among different intuitive notions of truth.…”
Section: Internal and Intuitive Truthmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…21 In conclusion, the knowledge operator K is a truth operator, and of course this operator does not satisfy the principle of bivalence. Concluding, it is true both (i) that the validity of the (T) schema expresses our essential intuition about the notion of truth, and (ii) that our most common intuitive notion of truth is realistic; but the reason why (ii) holds is bivalence, not the (T) schema: the validity of the (T) schema is neutral among different intuitive notions of truth.…”
Section: Internal and Intuitive Truthmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Tarski seems to hold that it does. In [21] he expresses the conviction that the material adequacy condition imposed onto the definition of truth, is capable to select the classical Aristotelian notion of truth as correspondence. The conviction is not explicitly stated, but it can be inferred from the following facts: (i) In section I.…”
Section: Internal and Intuitive Truthmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Based on category theory (Goguen 1991), Institutions abstract from both the syntax and the semantics of a given language to focus on the satisfaction relation of models. Institutions accomplish the Tarskian satisfaction condition requiring that truth is invariant under change of notation (Tarski 1944). In contrast with Barwise's (1974) abstract model theory, Institutions apply to any-order language and to many-sorted logics.…”
Section: Using Institutions To Build Modular Semantic Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Restating Alfred Tarski (1944), with respect to political discourse, the semantic rule "Th e utterance 'Snow is white' is true if snow is white" may be complemented by the indication of whether all of the conditions were met:…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%