The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes

Abstract

The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one's own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency.

On Language Learner Agency: A Complex Dynamic Systems Theory Perspective

“…It is not something “derived from internal representations of our own action‐related processes. Rather, it is essentially another dimension of our relation with the world, and derives from the ways in which we establish, lose, and re‐establish meaningful interactions between ourselves and our environment” (Buhrman & Di Paolo, , p. 216).…”

On the Self-Organizing Origins of Agency

“…How does our awareness of agency emerge from the electrical and chemical activity of the brain? Or does understanding agency rather require a broader view that encompasses brain, body and environment as theories of radical embodiment would demand [34, 46-48]. The present Opinion —implemented in a specific theoretical model [49] —addresses these and related queries.…”

“…Outside this response-for-reward framework, the main point is that when the value of a single parameter a reaches a critical point, it gives rise to the ‘eureka effect’, a sense of causal agency, “this is me making things happen in the world not some outside force making that attractive mobile oscillate.” The kicking rate increase is an autocatalytic or positive feedback process, typical of many pattern forming systems in nature [31, 65, 66]. As Buhrman and Di Paolo intuit in their philosophical writings “the sense of oneself… corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing and rerestablishing meaningful interactions with the world” [46]. Sheets-Johnstone [87], drawing on our specific formulation, says it even better: for her, the infant kicking in Phase 1 of the experiment accords with an elementary form of spontaneity, the infant is simply alive in its primal animation.…”

On the Self-Organizing Origins of Agency

“…The kicking rate increase is an autocatalytic or positive feedback process, typical of many pattern forming systems in nature [31,65,66]. As Buhrman and Di Paolo intuit in their philosophical writings "the sense of oneself… corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing and rerestablishing meaningful interactions with the world" [46]. Sheets-Johnstone [87], drawing on our specific formulation, says it even better: for her, the infant kicking in Phase 1 of the experiment accords with an elementary form of spontaneity, the infant is simply alive in its primal animation.…”

“…How does our awareness of agency emerge from the electrical and chemical activity of the brain? Or does understanding agency rather require a broader view that encompasses brain, body and environment as theories of radical embodiment would demand [34,[46][47][48]. The present Opinion -implemented in a specific theoretical model [49] addresses these and related queries.…”