The setting of non-financial goals in the family firm: The influence of family climate and identification

Lone founders, types of private family businesses and firm performance

“…Are the negative effects of family ownership stressed by the negative influence of professional management, such as being less able to benefit from altruism, short-term perspectives, or conflicts of interest, among others? Moreover, because family businesses have economic and non-economic goals (Astrachan, 2010;Cabrera-Suá rez, Dé niz-Dé niz, & Martín-Santana, 2014;Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012;Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013;, the variables should not only refer to financial returns -as shown in the present study -but also consider the level of underlying vision, attitudes, and intentions of the controlling family (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nú ñ ez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) or even the degree of identification family members have with the firm (Cabrera-Suá rez et al, 2014). Other limitations to consider may include a systematic bias regarding family firms with dispersed ownership and professional management, which have been excluded from our analysis due to the lack of firms that present these features.…”

Internal corporate sustainability drivers: What evidence from family firms? A literature review and research agenda

“…Whereas founder and family ownerships reduce the number of CSR concerns, the management dimension of family and founder firms goes in the opposite direction: The presence of family and founder CEOs in firms is associated with more CSR concerns. Cabrera‐Suárez, Déniz‐Déniz, and Martín‐Santana () identified two types of firms based on family participation: high family involvement (at least 50% of governance and management positions are held by family members) and low family involvement. This research shows that there is a different profile for the high involvement firms compared with the low‐involvement firms.…”

Social Tie Heterogeneity and Firms’ Networking Strategy

“…The strategic logic of controlling owner-managers requires an examination of their cognition and perception, such as their attention (Ocasio & Joseph, 2017) and prioritization of economic and non-economic foci (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). These elements can be captured through laboratory experiments on individuals' cognitive responses (Welpe, Spörrle, Grichnik, Michl, & Audretsch, 2012), survey questions about corporate goals (Cabrera-Suárez, Déniz-Déniz, & Martín-Santana, 2014;Chrisman et al, 2012), or the content analysis of corporate reports (Ocasio & Joseph, 2017). Regarding firm-level network constructs, future empirical studies could follow Mani and Durand's (in press) constructs of clustering, bridging, and embeddedness (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).…”