The Shadow of History in Inter-Organizational Cooperation for the Environment

Abstract

Why do international organizations (IOs) adopt different arrangements for cooperation? Drawing on the theory of institutional context and the rational theory of international design, I argue that a prior thick institution between IOs, which involves the adjustment of organizational mandates and/or activities, facilitates a decentralized arrangement for their current cooperation by fostering mutual expectations and reducing uncertainty. If the prior institution merely assumes direct combinations of resources and expertise, a centralized arrangement is needed to reduce uncertainty regarding the counterpart IO’s cooperative motive. With archival analysis and extensive interviews with IO staff members, this argument is tested against two empirical cases of inter-organizational cooperation undertaken by the United Nations Environment Program under the Minamata Convention on Mercury. The in-depth analysis reveals how IOs cope with demands and obstacles for inter-organizational cooperation on the ground, which has been largely unexplored in the literature.

Cooperation between international organizations: Demand, supply, and restraint

“…Moreover, the design of inter-organizational cooperation agreements varies. Whereas some sign formal and binding treaties, others opt for less binding memoranda of understanding or establish informal cooperative relationships (Gest & Grigorescu, 2010;Biermann, 2015;Avant & Westerwinter, 2016;Pratt, 2018;Uji, 2022). Agreements often differ in scope; they may cover only one specific issue or a broad range of policy areas (Betts, 2010;Hofmann, 2009).…”