The Short-War Illusion The Syndrome of German Strategy, August–December, 1914

Farrar, L. L.

doi:10.1524/mgzs.1972.12.2.39

Cited by 3 publications

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“…In the first week of August, Kaiser Wilhelm II told his troops that victory would be achieved “before the leaves fall” (quoted in Farrar 1972, 41). German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg told his predecessor that he was expecting “a war lasting three, or at the most, four months… a violent, but short storm” (quoted in Fischer 1967, 92).…”

Section: The Outbreak Of the First World Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some embrace the evidence but dismiss a rationalist explanation (see, e.g., Farrar 1972; Blainey 1988). Luigi Albertini argues that civilian leaders misunderstood the implications of mobilization and “surrendered” to the military's “wish for war” (Albertini 1952–1957, vol.…”

Section: The Outbreak Of the First World Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"While German generals predicted that within six weeks of the outbreak of war their vanguard would be near Paris, many French generals predicted that their soldiers would be at or across the Rhine" (Blainey 1988, 38). 18 Some embrace the evidence but dismiss a rationalist explanation (see, e.g., Farrar 1972;Blainey 1988). Luigi Albertini argues that civilian leaders misunderstood the implications of mobilization and "surrendered" to the military's "wish for war" (Albertini 1952(Albertini -1957.…”

Section: Controversies On Mutual Optimismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis

Debs

2020

American J Political Sci

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Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. I show that if countries have multiple reasons to fight—a favorable signal about the balance of power and a high resolve for the issue in dispute—then rational enemies can hold incompatible beliefs about the balance of power because an enemy's preference for war may not come from a favorable signal. Rational countries may even celebrate such an announcement, if it helps justify their own decision to fight. I discuss the implications of this argument for the causes of the First World War.

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Section: The Outbreak Of the First World Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Outbreak Of the First World Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Controversies On Mutual Optimismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis

Debs

2020

American J Political Sci

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Bir Pragmatik Eylem Düşüncesi Olarak Taarruz Ruhu ve Atatürk’ün Taarruzi Söylemi

Körpe

Kirik²

2018

Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi

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In the macro-peripheral analysis of strategic culture, history has gained a primary position. Since forms of use of force constitute a primary problematic in terms of historical analysis of strategic culture, "aggression" and "defensiveness" gain a relative priority and privilege in the historical analysis of strategic culture. The aggression, which constitutes the relatively dynamic side of the dichotomy, is expressed in the Western literature as "cult of offensive". The controversy of strategic offensive and defensive tendencies in the strategic culture is not an area to which the Turkish strategic culture is unfamiliar. Various authors have also identified a similar dichotomy in the Turkish strategic culture by defining attack/defense or daring/temptation. On the other hand, the pragmatic tendency found in Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's rhetoric as "the spirit of attack" constitutes also this research's problematic. In this research, the aggression in the Turkish Strategic culture will be analyzed through Atatürk's own writings, speeches, and statements.

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The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War

Evera¹

1984

International Security

268

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Bethmann Hollweg.1 They largely overlooked the lessons of the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War, which had demonstrated the power of the new defensive technologies. Instead, Europeans embraced a set of political and military myths which obscured both the defender's advantages and the obstacles an aggressor would confront. This mindset helped to mold the offensive military doctrines which every European power adopted during the period 1892-1913.2 In Germany, the military glorified the offense in strident terms, and inculcated German society with similar views. General Alfred von Schlieffen, author of the 1914 German war plan, declared that "Attack is the best defense," while the popular publicist Friedrich von Bernhardi proclaimed that "the offensive mode of action is by far superior to the defensive mode," and that "the superiority of offensive warfare under modern conditions is greater than formerly."3 German Chief of Staff General Helmuth von Moltke also endorsed "the principle that the offensive is the best defense," while General August von Keim, founder of the Army League, argued that "Germany ought to be armed for attack," since "the offensive is the only way of insuring victory."4 These assumptions guided the Schlieffen Plan, which envisaged Cult of the Offensive | 61 ... We also must follow this example."12 Even in Belgium the offensive found proponents: under the influence of French ideas, some Belgian officers favored an offensive strategy, proposing the remarkable argument that "To ensure against our being ignored it was essential that we should attack," and declaring that "We must hit them where it hurts. "13 Mythical or mystical arguments obscured the technical dominion of the defense, giving this faith in the offense aspects of a cult, or a mystique, as Marshall Joffre remarked in his memoirs.14 For instance, Foch mistakenly argued that the machine gun actually strengthened the offense: "Any improvement of firearms is ultimately bound to add strength to the offensive.. .. Nothing is easier than to give a mathematical demonstration of that truth." If two thousand men attacked one thousand, each man in both groups firing his rifle once a minute, he explained, the "balance in favor of the attack" was one thousand bullets per minute. But if both sides could fire ten times per minute, the "balance in favor of the attacker" would increase to ten thousand, giving the attack the overall advantage.15 With equally forced logic, Bernhardi wrote that the larger the army the longer defensive measures would take to execute, owing to "the difficulty of moving masses"; hence, he argued, as armies grew, so would the relative power of the offense.16 British and French officers suggested that superior morale on the attacking side could overcome superior defensive firepower, and that this superiority in morale could be achieved simply by assuming the role of attacker, since offense was a morale-building activity. One French officer contended that "the offensi...

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The Short-War Illusion The Syndrome of German Strategy, August–December, 1914

Cited by 3 publications

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Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis

Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis

Bir Pragmatik Eylem Düşüncesi Olarak Taarruz Ruhu ve Atatürk’ün Taarruzi Söylemi

The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War

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