The Six‐Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea

Grinter, Lawrence E.

doi:10.1111/j.1976-5118.2008.00015.x

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The real question, however, is whether CVID measures are still to be considered as valid if North Korea is indeed understood as being a nuclear power. Indeed, it might be more useful to consider a spectrum of denuclearization instead of absolute goals, along the lines of Grinter, who proposes three outlooks: complete denuclearization, partial denuclearization, and collapse of talks (Grinter 2008). Doing this allows for more flexibility when talks and negotiations do not yield expected outcomes: Albright's work could be of use as it largely focuses on the cooperative aspect of the process and the various steps needed to be implemented in order to reach the utmost goal of denuclearization (Albright and Hinderstein 2006).…”

Section: Conclusion: Going Beyond the Stalemate But How?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Failure to Relaunch?: The United States, Nuclear North Korea, and the Future of the Six-Party Talks

Grzelczyk¹

2012

North Korean Review

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The United States has been involved in negotiations with North Korea for almost twenty years. During this time, American policies have oscillated between tentative engagement under the Clinton Administration to isolation and multilateralism during the Bush Administration. There has been a number of positive results, such as the signing of agreements that paved the way to a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but at the same time North Korea has managed, despite its apparent commitment to international agreements and in spite of international controls and safeguards, to develop and test nuclear weapons. With the Obama Administration now in place, many expected a fast resolution of pressing issues such as reprocessing, missile testing, and the hopeful replacement of the Armistice by a peace treaty. But one year away from the end of his term, President Obama has little to show in terms of results: no round of Six-Party Talks have been held under his tenure, and North Korea's multiple attacks on the South in 2010 have created new instabilities on the peninsula. Why so little result despite the promise of an era of change, away from the Axis of Evil rhetoric, military intervention and hard-line politics? This paper suggests that the Obama Administration has failed to create an original policy toward North Korea as it has pursued policies that were once successful, but under a different set of circumstances, thus leaving only bleak prospects for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks process unless Washington designs new strategies to deal with an increasingly aggressive Pyongyang.

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Section: Conclusion: Going Beyond the Stalemate But How?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Failure to Relaunch?: The United States, Nuclear North Korea, and the Future of the Six-Party Talks

Grzelczyk¹

2012

North Korean Review

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“…36 36 Lawrence E. Grinter, “The Six‐Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization of North Korea,” Pacific Focus , 23‐3 (December 2008), pp. 306–307, and drawing on Martin Painter in, “The Politics of State Sector Reform in Vietnam: Contested Agendas and Uncertain Trajectories,” Journal of Development Studies (February 2005), p. 267.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea: Prospects after Kim Jong‐il

Grinter¹

2010

Pacific Focus

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Despite having signed or agreed to four formal weapon denuclearization agreements, the Kim Jong‐il family regime in Pyongyang shows no fundamental willingness to give up its nuclear weapons. Therefore this article looks past the denuclearization issue, and examines the potential for a future rehabilitation of North Korea's economy in a post‐Kim era. Four economic sectors or challenges are analyzed within the context of badly needed North Korean macroeconomic reform: energy utilization and the potential for a new natural gas arrangement with Russia; personal income growth tied to major labor reorientations focused on manufacturing for export; expanding capitalist projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex; and expanding DPRK foreign trade with South Korea, China, Russia and other countries. This paper's thesis is that once the Kim family legacy of autarchy, corruption, and militarism can be buried, and if a reformist North Korean regime comes forward and institutionalizes state‐directed capitalism (as occurred in China and Vietnam), North Korea already has the clear potential to economically develop, shed its tragic legacy, and be welcomed by the international community.

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“…17 17 For further details on the Six‐Party Talks, see Lawrence E. Grinter, “The Six‐Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea,” Pacific Focus , 23‐3 (December 2008), pp. 294–311. …”

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confidence: 99%

Moscow–Pyongyang Relations under Kim Jong‐il: High Hopes and Sober Reality*

Joo

2009

Pacific Focus

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With Putin's arrival in the Kremlin, a new era dawned in Moscow–Pyongyang relations. After a decade of estrangement, the two neighbors finally reached rapprochement in 2000. Political relations improved dramatically, but the momentum did not lead to noticeable expansion in military or economic cooperation. High hopes gave way to sober reality, and the two countries adjusted expectations and attitudes to one another. This article is intended to explicate the sudden rise of Moscow–Pyongyang relations shortly after Putin's inauguration and the rapid stagnation of the ties in subsequent years. Putin hoped to regain lost influence on Korean affairs by re‐establishing ties with Pyongyang. He also wanted to use joint economic projects to develop the Russian Far East and in doing so, assert Russia's position as a major power in Northeast Asia. He was not, however, willing to “pay the price.” Kim Jong‐il harbored unrealistic expectations of Russia as well. He was hopeful that Putin, as in the Soviet era, would readily grant his requests for military items, energy provision, and economic assistance, and provide them gratis. Repeated requests fell on deaf ears, and every time the same response was heard: “cash only!” Moscow and Pyongyang soon lowered their expectations toward each other. While trying to stay on Pyongyang's good side, Moscow seeks to project its image as an objective mediator and to promote multinational economic projects. Pyongyang, on the other hand, looks to Russia mostly as a counterbalance against the USA.

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The Six‐Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea

Cited by 6 publications

References 10 publications

Failure to Relaunch?: The United States, Nuclear North Korea, and the Future of the Six-Party Talks

Failure to Relaunch?: The United States, Nuclear North Korea, and the Future of the Six-Party Talks

The Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea: Prospects after Kim Jong‐il

Moscow–Pyongyang Relations under Kim Jong‐il: High Hopes and Sober Reality*

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