The socially acceptable scoring rule

Mahajne, Muhammad; Volij, Oscar

doi:10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9

Cited by 6 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Note that Mahajne and Volĳ (2018) introduced a scoring rule, called the half accepted-half rejected (HAHR), which always selects a socially acceptable candidate (and never selects a socially unacceptable candidate). HAHR assigns 1 point to the candidates placed above the line, −1 point to candidates below the line, and a score of 0 to the candidate (if there is one) on the line.…”

Section: Negative Plurality With Runoff (Nprr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assuming that voters have strict rankings (without indifference) on all running candidates, Mahajne and Volĳ (2018) introduce the concept of a socially acceptable candidate, which is a candidate whom at least half of the voters rank higher than at least half of the candidates in their rankings. They show that there always exists at least one socially acceptable candidate for every preference profile; however, such a candidate may not be elected under some scoring rules, with the exception of a new scoring rule, the half accepted-half rejected (HAHR) rule.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures

Awde

Diss

Kamwa³

et al. 2023

Studies in Choice and Welfare

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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

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Section: Negative Plurality With Runoff (Nprr)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures

Awde

Diss

Kamwa³

et al. 2023

Studies in Choice and Welfare

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show abstract

“…In the search for a certain consensus around a candidate, Mahajne and Volij (2018) have introduced the concept of social acceptability. They say that a candidate is socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank him among their most preferred half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank him among the least preferred half.…”

Section: Social (Un)acceptabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting

Kamwa¹

2023

Public Choice

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Preference Approval Voting (PAV) and Fallback Voting (FV) are two voting rules that combine approval and preferences, first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, voters rank the candidates and indicate which ones they approve of; with FV, they rank only those candidates they approve of. In this paper, we further develop the work of Brams and Sanver (2009) by exploring some other normative properties of FV and PAV. We show among other things that FV and PAV satisfy and fail the same criteria; they possess two properties that AV does not: Pareto optimality and the fact of always electing the Absolute Condorcet winner when he exists. To provide a practical comparison, we evaluate the probabilities of satisfying the Condorcet majority criteria for three-candidate elections and a considerably large electorate, examining FV and PAV alongside other voting rules. Our findings indicate that PAV outperforms the Borda rule in this regard. Furthermore, we observe that in terms of agreement, FV and PAV align more closely with scoring rules than with Approval Voting. Our analysis is performed under the impartial anonymous culture assumption.

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“…Mahajne and Volij [6] showed that every preference profile has a socially acceptable alternative. The next example shows that a Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable.…”

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet winners and social acceptability

Mahajne

Volij

2019

Soc Choice Welf

Self Cite

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We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable.

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The socially acceptable scoring rule

Cited by 6 publications

References 6 publications

Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures

Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures

On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting

Condorcet winners and social acceptability

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