1990
DOI: 10.1007/bf00484836
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The sorites paradox and higher-order vagueness

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Cited by 65 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…A. Burgess (1990) argues that between clear instances of properties there are indeterminate border areas. The boundaries of these border areas may themselves be indeterminate and may create several hierarchical levels or orders of indeterminate boundaries, which, Burgess argues, actually terminate at a finite level.…”
Section: Notes On Other Arguments For Irreducibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A. Burgess (1990) argues that between clear instances of properties there are indeterminate border areas. The boundaries of these border areas may themselves be indeterminate and may create several hierarchical levels or orders of indeterminate boundaries, which, Burgess argues, actually terminate at a finite level.…”
Section: Notes On Other Arguments For Irreducibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Perhaps only the concept of the heap is vague, while the object itself is sharp since we could possibly measure the number of grains. In spite of arguments such as that of Evans [22] who argues that vague objects are inconsistent, the majority opinion amongst recent writers is that there are indeed such objects [9,76,77,87].…”
Section: The Sorites Paradoxmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, the features are vague in a philosophical sense (Williamson 1994; Sainsbury 1989 1995, 25), which is to say that either the boundary condition is not well defined (semantic vagueness as defined in the sorites paradox or paradox of the heap; Sainsbury 1995), or the class to which a location is allocated may vary with perception (epistemic vagueness). Indeed, mountains in particular have formed one focus for the philosophical literature on vagueness, and the existence of vague objects (Varzi 2001; Burgess 1990; Sainsbury 1989). In essence, those authors pose the question ‘where is Snowdon (Sainsbury 1989) or Everest (Varzi 2001)?’ They argue that no meaningful answer can be clear‐cut, and in the philosophy literature the argument persists as to whether this is due to human perception dividing a landscape into features called mountains, or whether the mountains actually exist as vague objects (Burgess 1990; Sainsbury 1989 1995; Evans 1978).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%