The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought

Walsh, Philip

doi:10.1111/ejop.12207

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Merleau-Ponty would see here the same illegitimate generalization of the "analytic attitude" he finds in empiricist and intellectualist accounts of perception. Moreover, to treat love as an independent, determinate emotional fact awaiting discovery would be to commit to a "constancy hypothesis" about emotions: an emotion would be a fully formed 23 See Walsh (2016) and Wrathall (2006).…”

Section: Self-interpretivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, Merleau-Ponty contends that in "the relations between reflection and the unreflected … the founded term [the reflected] is presented as Here I am running into a multifarious tangle of issues involving Merleau-Ponty's conception of expression and its relation to language, motivation, reflection, and articulation. I do not have the space here to treat these matters with the subtlety they deserve Walsh (2016). does a helpful job framing the issues and some of the relevant debates.oneself and one's situation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Rousse

2023

Cont Philos Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides an interpretation of the existential conception of selfhood that follows from Merleau-Ponty's account of perception. On this view, people relate to themselves not by "looking within" in acts of introspection but, first, by "looking without" at the field of solicitations in which they are immersed and, eventually, in Merleau-Ponty's words, by "making explicit" the "melodic unity" or "immanent sense" of their behavior. To make sense of this, I draw out a distinction latent in Merleau-Ponty's view between a pre-reflective sense of self and a reflective self-interpretation. The former is a suite of abilities and dispositions in light of which a person is aware of and drawn to act in a situation. This sense of self undergoes transitions over time, is constitutively susceptible to moments of disorientation, and tends toward but never achieves full coherence. Reflective self-interpretation is an activity whereby someoneprovisionally and defeasibly-clarifies, articulates, and gets a better "grip" on how they are prereflectively drawn to act. I ground this interpretation in a detailed reading Merleau-Ponty's treatment of romantic love and I corroborate it by examining his account of the emergence of class-consciousness in the self-interpretation of a worker.

show abstract

Section: Self-interpretivementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Rousse

2023

Cont Philos Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…See Hass (: Chapters 6–7), Romdenh‐Romluc (: Chapter 7), and Walsh () for a discussion of Merleau‐Ponty's views regarding the relationship between thought, language, and expression.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I take the foundation relation to be an instance of the relation Merleau‐Ponty, following Husserl and Stein, calls “motivation.” So understood, the founding and founded phenomena are linked together neither by causes nor by reasons, but by a shared “sense” [sens] (Merleau‐Ponty, : 51/76). See Wrathall (), Romdenh‐Romluc (: 60–1, 113–4, 243–4), and Walsh () for a discussion of Merleau‐Ponty's use of the notion of motivation in general as something that structures perception, action, and thought.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Merleau‐Ponty on abstract thought in mathematics and natural science

Matherne

2018

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I argue that in spite of suggestions to the contrary, Merleau‐Ponty defends a positive account of the kind of abstract thought involved in mathematics and natural science. More specifically, drawing on both the Phenomenology of Perception and his later writings, I show that, for Merleau‐Ponty, abstract thought and perception stand in the two‐way relation of “foundation,” according to which abstract thought makes what we perceive explicit and determinate, and what we perceive is made to appear by abstract thought. I claim that, on Merleau‐Ponty's view, although this process can sometimes lead to falsification, it can also be carried out in such a manner that allows mathematics and natural science to articulate what we perceive in a way that is non‐distortive and in keeping with the demands of perception itself.

show abstract

Motivation as an epistemic ground

Antich

2021

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Merleau‐Ponty on abstract thought in mathematics and natural science

Motivation as an epistemic ground

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About