The Sources of Intentionality

Kriegel, Uriah

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.001.0001

Cited by 136 publications

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“…Suppose that it turned out that intentionality was not a relation to distinctly existing entities that play the roles of contents, but rather an adverbial modification of intentional subjects or intentional states, as some have argued (Kriegel 2007, 2011, Pitt 2009, Mendelovici 2018). On these non-relational views of intentionality, contents are psychological types, ways of representing, or aspects of intentional states, rather than entities existing distinctly of our intentional states that we grasp, entertain, or otherwise represent.…”

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confidence: 99%

Propositionalism without Propositions, Objectualism without Objects

Mendelovici¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This chapter argues that there is a distinction between the deep nature of intentional states and contents, which is what they really are, metaphysically speaking, and their superficial characters, which are the superficial features that characterize them as the intentional states or contents that they are. This chapter argues that there are two corresponding ways of understanding the debate between propositionalism and objectualism:(1) as a debate over whether there are intentional states with objectual deep natures, and (2) as a debate over whether there are intentional states with objectual superficial characters. I argue that we should understand the debate in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a brief discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content.

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confidence: 99%

Propositionalism without Propositions, Objectualism without Objects

Mendelovici¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…The most important dissimilarity is that while the modern concept's reference--fixing is grounded in the explanation of behavior, Brentano's is grounded in inner perception of conscious experiences. My own view is that the Brentanian concept is much more faithful to the folk's spontaneous, natural conception of mentality (Kriegel 2011 Ch.1); but that is not part of what I have argued here. My goal here has been to bring out the structure of Brentano's concept(ion) of mind, as the concept of whatever has the same the strict sense of the word.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 57%

Brentano’s Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental

Kriegel

2017

Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy

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Introduction/AbstractPerhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls 'inner perception' to demarcate the mental. In this chapter, Ioffer a new interpretation of Brentano's conception of the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural--kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner--perceivability serving as the concept's reference--fixer. Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental: Problems with the Orthodox InterpretationBrentano's (1874) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is an attempt to provide systematic conceptual and methodological foundations for the scientific study of mind. The first order of business for such an exercise is to offer a sound and principled demarcation of the relevant domain of phenomena. Brentano addresses this task in the first chapter of Book II of the Psychology. There are two problems with this interpretation, however. The first and most obvious is that in the chapter of the Psychology dedicated to the demarcation issue, Brentano endorses no fewer than six ways of drawing the mental/physical distinction. Intentionality is only one of them -the third he considers. In what sense, then, is intentionality the mark (rather than just a mark) of the mental? The others include:(M1) All and only mental phenomena are either presentations or based on presentations. 2 (M2) All and only mental phenomena are not spatially extended. 3 (M4) All and only mental phenomena are objects of inner perception. 4 (M4')All and only mental phenomena are objects of perception in the success sense of the term (Wahrnehmung). 5 (M5) All and only mental phenomena are not only phenomenally but also noumenally real (they are not only appearances but also realities). 6 (M6) All and only mental phenomena necessarily appear to us as unities. 7 I will discuss some of these more fully in §3. For now, what is important to note is that intentionality is neither the first nor the last of the marks discussed by Brentano, and he does not discuss it at any special length. 4 My goal in this chapter is to present an interpretation of Brentano's view that answers these questions. I will try to show that Brentano's view is not only stable but also quite plausible. In §2, I lay out my interpretation without argument. In § §3--4, I make a case for the interpretation's assignment of theoretical roles to intentionality and inner--perceivability (respectively). The Concept of Mind: Reference-Fixing and Underlying NatureThe tension between intentionality and inner--perceivability as potential signatures of the mental is arguably a manifestation of a deeper tension that is something of a recurring theme in the philosophy of mind. This is the tension between metaphysical and epistemological ways of conceiving of the mental domain. There are good...

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“…Rather, one thinks of a mind-dependent entity, a thought-of entity as some might say: in other words, an entity whose existence somehow depends on the existence of the mind that thinks of it (a contemplated Queen, in our example). 19 In turn, this notion of existential dependence that allegedly accounts for intentional inexistence is traditionally rendered in modal terms. 20 An intentional object exists in a mental state in the sense that it modally depends on the existence of that state for its existence: necessarily, if the intentional object exists, then the mental state that thinks of it exists as well.…”

Section: Intentional Inexistence As Mind-dependent Existencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…One may indeed suppose that, taken as immanent existence, the intentional inexistence of the intentional object is rendered by the fact that the object depends on the mental state that is about it not only for its existence, but also for its individuation. In this 29 Kriegel [19] tries to account for this problem by allowing for a veridical mental state to also entertain a relation with the existent object it is causally connected with. Such a relation grounds the possession for that state of its monadic intentionality property.…”

Section: Intentional Inexistence As Individuationmentioning

confidence: 99%