Bell non-local correlations cannot be naturally explained in a fixed causal structure. This serves as a motivation for considering models where no global assumption is made beyond logical consistency.The assumption of a fixed causal order between a set of parties, together with free randomness, implies device-independent inequalities-just as the assumption of locality does. It is known that local validity of quantum theory is consistent with violating such inequalities. Moreover, for three parties or more, even the (stronger) assumption of local classical probability theory plus logical consistency allows for violating causal inequalities. Here, we show that a classical environment (with which the parties interact), possibly containing loops, is logically consistent if and only if whatever the involved parties do, there is exactly one fixed-point, the latter being representable as a mixture of deterministic fixedpoints. We further show that the non-causal view allows for a model of computation strictly more powerful than computation in a world of fixed causal orders.
Historical background on space, time, and causalityThe debate about as how fundamental space and time are to be seen has a long history in within natural philosophy. In pre-Socratic time, the opposite standpoints on the question have arisen in the views of Parmenides as opposed to Heraclitus: for the latter, the stage set by a fundamental space-time structure is where the play of permanent change-for him synonymous to existence-happens. Parmenides' world view, on the other hand, is static and such that space and, in particular, time emerge only subsequently and only subjectively. The described opposition can be seen as a predecessor of the famous debate between Newton and Leibniz [13], centuries later. Whereas Newton starts from an initially given and static space-time, Leibniz was criticising that view: space, for instance, is for him merely relational and not absolute. The course of occidental science decided to go for Newtonʼs (overly successful) picture, until Leibniz' relational view was finally adopted by Mach. Indeed, Machʼs principle states that inertial forces are purely relational, and it was the crystallisation point of Einsteinʼs general relativity although the latter did, in the end, not satisfy the principle; however, it does propose a dynamic space-time structure (still absolute, though) in which, additionally, space and time become closely intertwined where they have been seen independently in Newtonʼs picture.