The spear point and the ground beneath: territorial constraints on the logic of Responsibility to Protect

Abstract

The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) faces considerable criticism, of both its inefficacy – its failure to describe an effective pathway around the obstacles to humanitarian intervention in the sclerotic global security system – and its overreach, especially the risk that it enables pretextual agendas of intervention and regime change. Yet neither defenders nor critics have paid much attention to another possibility or risk incumbent in R2P: the likelihood, once intervention is undertaken, that the interveners themselves will be involved in a conflict over territory, whose likely solutions will include, not simply regime change, but partition. The doctrine as we now have it, built thoroughly on a state-centric logic, does not engage with this question, and indeed there are strategic reasons for ignoring the issue: acknowledging such a quality would be too much for R2P’s supporters to admit or its critics to accept. But whatever our normative orientation toward this rising or stumbling doctrine, we ought to be clear about where taking it seriously is really likely to lead us: sooner or later – and more often than we might wish to acknowledge – R2P interventions will force us to confront the logic of partition.

Unipolarity’s unpeacefulness and US foreign policy: consequences of a ‘coherent system of irrationality’

“…As Timothy Waters recently noted, neither those who approved of Kosovo on humanitarian grounds, nor later proponents of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) considered the impact of the use of force to defend the norm on the territorial changes they might implicate. 81 This is, despite all claims by later proponents of the R2P (who previously approved of Kosovo) that the notion had no intention to overthrow or redraw sovereign boundaries. 82 Kissinger understood the matter from the start.…”