The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

Abstract

Simple Summary: An influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one's own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled 'speciesism', in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue 'Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy'.Abstract: This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant ('species-relativism'). Third, if we adopt Singer's definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions-the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests-is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant."Our inclination to treat humans as though we are special is no mere prejudice. Despite what Singer says, there is a significant philosophical view at work here-one worthy of careful further investigation." Shelly Kagan [1] (p. 20)"At the end of the day, no clear consensus has emerged-or, at best, this one: no rejoinder to Singer's attack on speciesism has convinced many besides its author, and the challenge remains." François Jaquet [2] (p. 2)

Alternative Paradigms in Animal Health Decisions: A Framework for Treating Animals Not Only as Commodities

“…Theories cannot be debunked based only on surveys, but this helps clarify the perspectives of the participants to start from a different approach and continue debating about the value of animals for integrative solutions in health. Methods of dialogue and reflection should be complemented [ 99 ], but for that, this framework might facilitate a starting point. By collecting the values of many people from different backgrounds, it is expected to gain a better understanding of how humans value animals to contribute to “One Health” in order to address health challenges, such as zoonoses.…”

Alternative Paradigms in Animal Health Decisions: A Framework for Thinking beyond Money

“…We are aware that we cannot debunk theories based only on surveys, but this helps clarify the perspectives of the participants to start from a different approach and continue debating about the value of animals for integrative solutions in health. Methods of dialogue and reflection should be complemented (49), but for that, we need a starting point that might facilitate through this framework. By collecting the values of many people from different backgrounds, we expect to gain a better understanding of how humans value animals to contribute to "One Health" to address health challenges in prevention of animal diseases that can be transmitted to humans (zoonoses) and in animal welfare.…”

Posthümanizm ve yeni bir ayrımcılık biçimi olarak robotlara yönelik türcülük

“…Türcülüğün Singer tarafından önyargı içeren ahlaki bir problem olarak tanımlanmasına ilişkin son zamanlarda Kagan (2015) ve Singer (2015) arasında devam eden felsefi tartışmaya değinmek yerinde olur. Bu tartışma türcülüğe ahlaki açıdan savunulabilir bir argüman sunduğu için farklı görüş ve tepkilere neden olmuştur (Director, 2021;Jaquet, 2022;Albersmeier, 2021;Hopster, 2019). Felsefe profesörü Shelly Kagan 2015 yılında Türcülüğün Nesi Yanlış?…”