The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law

Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally

“…While the conventional wisdom identifies the government as a key provider of governance, theoretical research identifies a range of nonstate mechanisms that can make self-enforcing exchange viable (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981;Dixit 2007;Kreps 1990). An important empirical literature shows how extralegal governance works in practice in both historical and contemporary settings (Benson 1989;Bernstein 1992;Ellickson 1991;Greif 1993Greif , 2006bLeeson 2007aLeeson , 2007cLeeson , 2008Leeson , 2009Milgrom et al 1990;Schaeffer 2008;Stringham 2015). Laboratory experiments and simulations also identify when self-governance is possible (Axelrod 1981;Ostrom et al 1992).…”

“…History provides many examples of successful decentralized governance regimes that rely on reputation and the threat of ostracism (Benson 1989;Bernstein 1992;Greif 1993;Milgrom et al 1990;Ellickson 1991). In these cases, bilateral and multilateral punishment regimes deter opportunism at low cost.…”

Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model of Legal Development

“…For several hundred years since then, merchants had to rely on social relations and networks (relational contracts) to handle contract issues with each other (Benson 1989). Legal development in contract enforcement was not put on the political agenda until much later in history.…”

The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments

“…In theory they can therefore avoid public courts, procedures and judges, even public contract rules-other than the rules enforcing their agreement about dispute resolution. Historically, private contract enforcement has been an important factor in the development of commercial contracting (Benson 1989, Greif 1993. Internationally, private arbitration plays an essential role in trade between countries.…”