The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

Feinberg, Robert M.; Reynolds, Kara M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.614864

Cited by 43 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…They consider antidumping duties as allowed under certain contingencies in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. Motivated by empirical work by Blonigen and Bown (2003), Feinberg and Reynolds (2006), and Prusa and Skeath (2002) that provides evidence of a retaliatory role for antidumping duties, Martin and Vergote argue that such on-equilibrium-path retaliation may facilitate efficiency gains by ensuring that the home government protects its import-competing industry with an antidumping duty only when the current importance of that industry to the home government is sufficiently great. In this case, when the home government imposes an antidumping duty, a link is forged to a future retaliatory antidumping duty of the foreign country.…”

Section: Contingent Protection Such As Safeguards and Antidumpingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

103

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The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to some caveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. (JEL F13, F14, K33, N70)

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Section: Contingent Protection Such As Safeguards and Antidumpingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

103

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“…12 During the second part of the preliminary phase, the US Department of Commerce makes a preliminary determination of dumping against each country j listed in a petition. 13 The dumping margin for country j is calculated as the difference in the price charged by country j producers in the US and country j,the US and a third market, or the difference between the price charged in the US price and the average total cost of production of a firm in country j. Preliminary dumping margins vary considerably across countries listed within a petition, with the USDOC occasionally finding that there is no evidence of dumping by some countries that have been found guilty of causing injury.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001

Crowley

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper estimates the impact of economic conditions in foreign industries on the filing of antidumping petitions by US industries and the US government's decision in preliminary and final antidumping investigations. Exploiting cross-country variation in economic shocks in manufacturing, I estimate a joint model of filing decisions by the US industry and antidumping decisions by the US government. Terms of use: Documents inI find strong evidence that economic weakness in a foreign industry is associated with an increase in the probability of antidumping protection. After controlling for other political and economic factors that likely drive industry filing and government decisions including US GDP growth, I find that a one standard deviation fall in the growth of employment (consumption) in a foreign economy's manufacturing industry doubles (triples) the joint probability that the US industry will file an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a preliminary (temporary) antidumping measure. The effect of weakness in a foreign economy is even larger for final antidumping measures. A one standard deviation fall in foreign employment (consumption) growth increases the joint probability that a petition will be filed and a final (long-lasting) antidumping measure will be imposed by a factor of five (seven). In finding that US trade policy is applied counter-cyclically to foreign economic fluctuations, the paper suggests that trade policy may reduce the extent of business cycle transmission across countries.JEL Codes: F12, F13

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“…Blonigen and Bown(2003) find that strategic considerations, in particular the share of US exports in the potential target country, can influence the decision by the US to file an AD case. Aggarwal (2004), Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) also find a positive relationship between retaliation and AD filings. Dong (2013) argues that the underlying reasons for AD should be strategic in nature, in particular, retaliatory.…”

Section: Strategic Determinants Of Antidumpingmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…However, the nature of the relationship is subject to some ambiguity. On the one hand, Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) argue that trade liberalization, and the associated lowering of traditional sources of protection, has been associated with increased AD use in some developing countries. Similarly, Bown and Tovar (2011) conclude that Indian trade liberalization efforts may have increased the probability of AD filings.…”

Section: Macroeconomic Determinants Of Antidumpingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differences in the determinants and targeting of antidumping: China and India compared

2016

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Despite both being developing countries, China and India have markedly contrasting patterns in their use and targeting of antidumping (AD) measures. We explore the factors driving AD use by these two countries, considering in turn macroeconomic, strategic and other determinants. We find more regular or systematic features of AD use by China, while India displays a less systematic pattern of AD use. Economic growth, AD club effect and FTA participation are shown to constrain AD use by China. Compared to India, AD use by China is also more sensitive across industries. Furthermore, China targets developed countries more than developing countries, while India is less discriminating with respect to the country type it targets.

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The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

Cited by 43 publications

References 15 publications

Is the WTO Passé?

Is the WTO Passé?

Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001

Differences in the determinants and targeting of antidumping: China and India compared

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