The State as Investment Market: A Framework for Interpreting the Post‐Soviet State in Eurasia

Abstract

What type of state has emerged in post‐Soviet Eurasia, and what kind of theoretical framework can help us understand its behavior and performance? This article argues that we can usefully understand the logic of political and administrative organization in terms of a kind of “investment market.” Access to the state is frequently determined by actual financial payment. Would‐be officials invest in offices to obtain access to a stream of income associated with an office. This framework represents a novel perspective on the post‐Soviet state, which has hitherto either been premised on modernization theory or emphasized a robustly personalistic logic of political organization.

Political Capital, Everyday Politics and Moral Obligations: Understanding the Political Strategies of Various Elites and the Poor in Kyrgyzstan

“…Super-rich former nomenklatura elite and business -criminal groups compete for lucrative government jobs by buying appointed posts or running for elected posts. The political field operates as a market, in that official positions are sold at a high price (Engvall 2011). Absatar, a farmer in Kochkor village, explains how elite members have to steal from the state to recover their costs:…”

Informal payments and connections in post-Soviet Kazakhstan

“…Although the 'price' for a post is often much higher than the official monthly salary, people are ready to pay it because the informal income one can generate by holding a public office over a certain period pays off the initial expense of buying it. In other words, such incomes and other rents associated with a post are collected as returns from an 'investment' in public office (Engvall 2014(Engvall , 2015. It is within this system of public posts for sale that exploitive activities of officials occur (Humphery and Sneath 2004;Rasanayagam 2011).…”

The Institutionalization of Mobility: Well-being and Social Hierarchies in Central Asian Translocal Livelihoods

“…At that time, in 2004, for a young Kyrgyz male, there were several opportunities that conventionally qualified to carry this label. For some, success would have meant to become a chinovnik and enter into the ranks of public office, for which in Kyrgyzstan's corrupt bureaucratic system the prime 'return of investment' usually comes in the form of bribes and business protection (Engvall 2011). As we will see in a later case study, other young people in Kyrgyzstan feel that their future rather lies in the vibrant sector of international, 'Western'-funded organizations, which aside from solid salaries also offer training programmes for continuing professional education.…”