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World War I was fought by numerous countries siding together as the Central Powers and, respectively, the Allied Powers. The former began with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary and grew to four allies when the Ottoman Empire entered the scene in late 1914 and Bulgaria in late 1915; the latter centred on the alliance between England, France, and Russia and was informally extended to many more countries as they entered into the war ad-hoc by signalling common interests with the core Allied Powers. This article addresses a neglected dimension of the alliance formation phenomenon, namely how alliances were perceived by the public, in contrast to the perceptions of political and military leaders. Were the Central and Allied Powers perceived to be credible alliances – monolithic blocks – in the eyes of contemporaries? We seek to determine the degree of “alliance integration” among pairs of countries by applying cointegration analysis based on prices for securities. It is assumed that the prices of countries perceived as “integrated” should show signs of co-movement. In particular, we focus on the Amsterdam market for foreign government bonds providing us with a neutral perspective. Our analysis is based on the yields for representative bonds traded by 13 belligerent countries not only during the war, but also before and after. Among other findings, we cannot corroborate that investors simply recognized two monolithic blocks fighting the war against each other.
World War I was fought by numerous countries siding together as the Central Powers and, respectively, the Allied Powers. The former began with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary and grew to four allies when the Ottoman Empire entered the scene in late 1914 and Bulgaria in late 1915; the latter centred on the alliance between England, France, and Russia and was informally extended to many more countries as they entered into the war ad-hoc by signalling common interests with the core Allied Powers. This article addresses a neglected dimension of the alliance formation phenomenon, namely how alliances were perceived by the public, in contrast to the perceptions of political and military leaders. Were the Central and Allied Powers perceived to be credible alliances – monolithic blocks – in the eyes of contemporaries? We seek to determine the degree of “alliance integration” among pairs of countries by applying cointegration analysis based on prices for securities. It is assumed that the prices of countries perceived as “integrated” should show signs of co-movement. In particular, we focus on the Amsterdam market for foreign government bonds providing us with a neutral perspective. Our analysis is based on the yields for representative bonds traded by 13 belligerent countries not only during the war, but also before and after. Among other findings, we cannot corroborate that investors simply recognized two monolithic blocks fighting the war against each other.
This paper introduces a large new cross-country databaseStepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is on political institutions: the Database on Political more likely to survive under parliamentary governments Institutions (DPI).than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh summarize key the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises variables (many of them new), compare this data set with puzzles for f'uture research. others, and explore the range of issues for which the data Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that divided should prove invaluable. governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits Among the novel variables they introduce: after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI * Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, balances.again suggesting issues for future research. * Identification of parties with the government Among questions in political science and economics coalition or the opposition.that this database may illuminate: the determinants of * Fragmentation of opposition and government democratic consolidation, the political conditions for parties in legislatures.economic reform, the political and institutional roots of The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables corruption, and the elements of appropriate and to several problems in political economy.institutionally sensitive design of economic policy.This papera product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Groupis part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional bases of poverty alleviation artd economic reform. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Database on Institutions for Government Decisionmaking" (RPO 682-79). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank,
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