The strategic behavior of Chinese enterprises using R&amp;D subsidies: game model and empirical research

Zhang, Bochao; Zhang, Baizhen; Di, Junpeng; Han, Qing

doi:10.1080/00036846.2021.2023089

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…R & D direct subsidies and tax incentives are commonly used as policy instruments. Studies have shown that tax has a more substantial incentive effect on R & D than direct subsidies (Zhang et al, 2017). The tax provides firms with greater autonomy and can indirectly guide their behaviour through market mechanisms.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

Wang¹,

Jiang²

2023

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This paper aims to answer whether super deduction of R & D expense policy (SD policy), a preferential tax policy, effectively stimulates a firm's R & D in the first place and whether the policy is affected by the firm's political connections in the second. By theoretically exploring how SD policy and political connection influence a firm's R & D expense behaviour, the paper then empirically examines the effects using firm-level data in China. Results show that SD policy stimulates firms' R & D significantly, which was, however, mitigated by political connections. Besides, the types of political connections of a firm's CEO have heterogeneous effects on the SD policy-R & D expense nexus in the way that CEOs with CPC and NPC backgrounds have a promotive effect but are statistically insignificant. In contrast, CEOs with government and CPPCC backgrounds have an inhibitive effect.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

Wang¹,

Jiang²

2023

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The role of construction industry and construction policy on sustainable rural development in China

Zhang

et al. 2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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Social Enterprise Under Moral Hazard: Who Gets State Subsidies and Active Financing?

Lovas,

Berlinger,

Tóth

2024

Eur J Dev Res

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We develop a double-sided moral hazard model of social entrepreneurship and derive the optimal state subsidy. Then, we analyze the data of an EU-funded training and mentoring program aiming at preparing social entrepreneurs for private financing. Using content analysis techniques, we investigate the 203 applications for the program, the reviewers’ evaluation, and the selection decision. Social enterprises produce private and public benefits, use market and non-market resources, and involve a wide range of stakeholders with different incentives. We examine why different projects can get active financing (financing plus advisory), or only passive financing (financing without advisory), or no financing at all. We identify five relevant selection criteria such as entrepreneurial net present value, entrepreneurial agency cost, advisory net present value, advisory agency cost, and the external effects of the project. Empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical model. Applicants with higher scores in business plan, social impact, and geographical scope were significantly more likely to be selected, especially if their activities required no domain-specific knowledge from the advisors. However, higher agency costs, reflected in too many business lines and early-stage operations, seem to reduce the chances significantly. We formulate a moral hazard model for social entrepreneurship with four simultaneously optimizing players: an entrepreneur, an investor, an advisor, and the state. With the help of our unique database, we get valuable insights into the financing decisions of a profit-seeking investor. Our findings can contribute to the improvement of the design of state-subsidized social entrepreneurship programs.

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The strategic behavior of Chinese enterprises using R&D subsidies: game model and empirical research

Cited by 4 publications

References 8 publications

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

The role of construction industry and construction policy on sustainable rural development in China

Social Enterprise Under Moral Hazard: Who Gets State Subsidies and Active Financing?

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The strategic behavior of Chinese enterprises using R&D subsidies: game model and empirical research

Cited by 4 publications

References 8 publications

SD Policy, Political Connection and R &amp; D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

SD Policy, Political Connection and R &amp; D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

The role of construction industry and construction policy on sustainable rural development in China

Social Enterprise Under Moral Hazard: Who Gets State Subsidies and Active Financing?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China

SD Policy, Political Connection and R & D Expense: Firm-Level Evidence from China