The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Demange, Gabrielle; Gale, David

doi:10.2307/1912658

Cited by 276 publications

(330 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…7 This result was proved by Demange and David (1985) for a more general model. It is a particular case of theorem 9.23 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), due to Sotomayor (1986).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Além disso,é sempre possível para o leiloeiro escolher uma alocação eficiente. Demange (1982), Leonard (1983), Demange and David (1985) and Sotomayor (1999) have considered an allocation mechanism that turns out to be a multiitem generalization of the "first price" auction described by Vickrey (1961). In this auction, the buyers submit sealed bids for a single item, which is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to her bid.…”

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confidence: 99%

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A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Sotomayor¹

2002

Rev. Bras. Econ.

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Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The competitive market and the auction mechanism; 3. The main results; 4. Concluding remarks.Keywords: auction mechanism; competitive equilibrium; demand set.JEL codes: C78 and D78. This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.Este artigo propõe um novo método de lances descendentes para leiloar múltiplos objetos com demanda unitária. O leiloeiro anuncia um preço, os compradores indicam suas demandas ao preço anunciado, e o leiloeiro desce os preços até que todo objeto esteja alocado para algum comprador que o tenha demandado e ninguém esteja comprando mais do que um item. Os aspectos importantes deste mecanismo são que os objetos são vendidos simultaneamente a preços competitivos, quaisquer dois objetos similares são vendidos ao mesmo preço e independentemente das escolhas do leiloeiro o mecanismo sempre produz o mesmo preço final, o preço máximo de equilíbrio competitivo. Além disso,é sempre possível para o leiloeiro escolher uma alocação eficiente.

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“…7 This result was proved by Demange and David (1985) for a more general model. It is a particular case of theorem 9.23 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), due to Sotomayor (1986).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Sotomayor¹

2002

Rev. Bras. Econ.

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“…This means that we are interested in equilibria in the strong version. (A similar concept has been defined by Demange and Gale (1985).) Also, we continue to require that the buyers use maximal strategies.…”

Section: Rbe Rio De Janeiro 57(4):931-952 Out/dez 2003mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also concentrate on the analysis of the SPE in the strong sense (Demange and Gale, 1985). To be an equilibrium in the strong sense, the strategies of the participants must be robust to deviations by any optimistic seller.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, they also implement particular subsets of the stable correspondence. 3 For the assignment game, Demange and Gale (1985) analyze the properties of a mechanism in which agents announce their demand and supply functions, and then a referee calculates the minimum equilibrium price and allocates the objects accordingly. For the buyers, the mechanism is not coalitionally manipulable in the sense that no coalition of buyers can achieve higher payoffs to all of its members by falsifying demands.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A selling mechanism

Pérez‐Castrillo¹,

Sotomayor

2003

Rev. Bras. Econ.

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Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The assignment game; 3. The selling mechanism; 4. The equilibria of the selling mechanism; 5. Some additional examples. Keywords: matching model; assignment model; mechanism; implementation.JEL codes: C78; D78.For the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.Propomos o seguinte mecanismo para o assignment game: os vendedores, simultaneamente, fixam seus preços. Então, um após o outro, os compradores decidem que objetos comprar, se houver algum. A primeira fase do jogo determina os preços dos objetos que forem vendidos, enquanto a segunda fase determina o matching real. Provamos que o conjunto dos equilíbrios perfeitos de subjogo em estrategias puras no sentido forte, do jogo induzido pelo mecanismo, coincide com o conjunto dos resultados estáveisótimos para os vendedores quando os compradores usam estratégias maximais.

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Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation

Schummer

2000

Games and Economic Behavior

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The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Cited by 276 publications

References 9 publications

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

A selling mechanism

Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation

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