The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron; Martin, Lucy E. S.; Scheve, Kenneth

doi:10.1086/687324

Cited by 119 publications

(101 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Behind much of the literature on individual tax morale is one such consideration: the individual's perception of reciprocity (Frey and Torgler, 2007;Daude et al, 2013;Castro and Scartascini, 2015;Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017;Carrillo et al, 2017;Cullen et al, 2018).…”

Section: Taxation Reciprocity and The Social Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a consequence, ever since Margaret Levi's seminal Of Rule and Revenue (Levi, 1989), the importance of beliefs about reciprocity have been central to the literature. Bergman (2010), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2013), Beramendi and Rehm (2016) and Ballard-Rosa et al (2017) have all subsequently demonstrated that the willingness to pay taxes is conditioned upon the degree to which individuals perceive public goods provision to be fair, while Daude et al 2013, Kuziemko et al (2015) and Ortega et al (2016) have focused on how tax morale is shaped by whether or not citizens believe the government has the ability to effectively deliver public goods. Others have emphasized the importance of whether citizens believe they will receive some form of reciprocal benefit in return for paying tax (Daude et al, 2013;Castro and Scartascini, 2015;Carrillo et al, 2017;Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017) and there is also a small body of evidence indicating that the payment of tax can encourage citizens to be more willing to hold their government to account, at least in Indonesia and Uganda (Paler, 2013;Martin, 2014).…”

Section: Taxation Reciprocity and The Social Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More specifically, we contribute to the burgeoning literature on the individual-level determinants of tax compliance (e.g. Bergman, 2010;Luttmer and Singhal, 2014;Kuziemko et al, 2015;Duch and Solaz, 2015;Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017) by focusing our attention on states where the benefits of paying taxes are not self-evident and, often, not desired. The importance of examining tax morale under such conditions cannot be overstated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

Castañeda

Doyle

Schwartz

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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We examine the individual-level determinants of tax morale in low-capacity states, specifically Latin American countries, where the social contract is often perceived as fractured. We argue that individuals in such states perceive the social contract as an agreement to which they can opt in or opt out. Those who choose to opt out prefer to substitute state-provided goods for private providers, rather than pay for public goods through taxes or free ride to receive those goods. Through a list experiment conducted in Mexico City, we demonstrate that willingness to evade taxes is highest when individuals have stepped outside of the social contract. More traditional indicators of reciprocity—such as socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption—are not significant. We bolster our experimental results with observational data from 17 Latin American cities; those with access to employer-sponsored insurance are more willing to evade tax.

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Section: Taxation Reciprocity and The Social Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Taxation Reciprocity and The Social Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

Castañeda

Doyle

Schwartz

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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“…In parallel to rising inequality, taxation over the rich is now object of growing attention (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016;Young et al, 2016;Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017;Landier and Plantin, 2017;Hatgioannides et al 2018). Ballard-Rosa et al (2017) provide experimental evidence uncovering changes in redistributive preferences in the presence of high inequality, with direct implications on the perception of high income taxation. They show, in particular, that "conflict over taxation is primarily conflict over taxing the rich" (p. 14).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fresh look at fiscal redistribution and inequality in the US across electoral cycles

Sala

2019

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

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“…Recent research on individual tax preferences indicates that while higher tax levels are politically unpopular, greater tax progressivity is not (Barnes, 2015, Roosma et al, 2015, Ballard-Rosa et al, 2016). This will be of interest to governments seeking politically feasible means of redistribution where the scope for increasing state spending is limited.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare state structure, inequality, and public attitudes towards progressive taxation

Berens

Gelepithis

2018

Socio-Economic Review

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Recent research indicates that while higher tax levels are politically unpopular, greater tax progressivity is not. However, there remain unanswered questions regarding public support for more progressive taxation. In particular, little is known about how individual attitudes towards tax progressivity are affected by their institutional context. Building on existing theories of redistribution, this article develops the argument that the structure of the welfare state shapes public attitudes towards progressive taxation—support for progressive taxation among both average and high-income households is undermined by ‘pro-poor’ welfare spending. We support our argument with a cross-sectional analysis of rich democracies, interacting household income with country-level indicators of welfare state structure. In doing so, we contribute a micro-level explanation for the paradoxical macro-level phenomenon that larger, more redistributive welfare states tend to be financed by less progressive tax systems.

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The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences

Cited by 119 publications

References 45 publications

Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

A fresh look at fiscal redistribution and inequality in the US across electoral cycles

Welfare state structure, inequality, and public attitudes towards progressive taxation

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