The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility

Abstract

An examination of the powerful social and psychological factors that hold the belief in moral responsibility firmly in place. The philosophical commitment to moral responsibility seems unshakable. But, argues Bruce Waller, the philosophical belief in moral responsibility is much stronger than the philosophical arguments in favor of it. Philosophers have tried to make sense of moral responsibility for centuries, with mixed results. Most contemporary philosophers insist that even conclusive proof of determinism would not and should not result in doubts about moral responsibility. Many embrace compatibilist views, and propose an amazing variety of competing compatibilist arguments for saving moral responsibility. In this provocative book, Waller examines the stubborn philosophical belief in moral responsibility, surveying the philosophical arguments for it but focusing on the system that supports these arguments: powerful social and psychological factors that hold the belief in moral responsibility firmly in place. Waller argues that belief in moral responsibility is not isolated but rather is a central element of a larger belief system; doubting or rejecting moral responsibility will involve major adjustments elsewhere in a wide range of beliefs and values. Belief in moral responsibility is one strand of a complex and closely woven fabric of belief, comprising threads from biology, psychology, social institutions, criminal justice, religion, and philosophy. These dense interconnections, Waller contends, make it very difficult to challenge the belief in moral responsibility at the center. They not only influence the philosophical arguments in favor of moral responsibility but also add powerful extraphilosophical support for it.

The Public Health-Quarantine Model

“…In fact, the opposite seems to be the case-the problem of disproportionate punishment seems to grow more out of a desire for retribution and the belief that people justly deserve what they get than from free will skepticism. This claim is further supported by the fact that individual states within the United States with stronger belief in individual moral responsibility tend to have harsher forms of punishment (see Waller 2014Waller , 2015. Given these cross-cultural and inter-state comparisons, I cannot help but conclude along with Waller that, "commitment to moral responsibility exacerbates rather than prevents excessively harsh punitive policies" (2014: 7).…”

“…For many, it is not the philosophical arguments for free will skepticism that are the problem, it is the existential angst they create and the fear that relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert moral responsibility would undermine morality, negatively affect our interpersonal relationships, destroy meaning in life, and leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior. Optimistic skeptics, however, respond by arguing that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as these critics maintain, and, in fact, may be preferable in a number of important ways (see Pereboom 1995Pereboom , 2001Pereboom , 2014Waller 2011Waller , 2015Caruso 2016Caruso , 2017aCaruso , 2017bPereboom and Caruso 2018). These optimistic skeptics argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened.…”

Putting Free Will in Cultural Context and Beyond

“…The stakes, of course, are high-namely, the potential to shake the foundations of our basic social institutions-and hence an understandable fear of contributing to social and institutional disruption perhaps inhibits some from thinking more boldly. Nevertheless, the pursuit of understanding ought not to be compromised by such fears and the apologetic projects they drive (Waller 2013).…”

Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism

“…The problem, I maintain, is the belief that individuals justly deserve what they get. The idea of just deserts-which is central to the moral responsibility system (see Waller 2011Waller , 2013-is a pernicious one. For one, it often encourages punitive excess in criminal justice, including extreme forms of retributive punishment such as the death penalty.…”

“…In the following, I will take free will to mean the control in action needed for an agent to be morally responsible in the basic desert sense-the sense needed to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments, such as resentment, indignation, moral anger, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment (see Pereboom 2001Pereboom , 2014Caruso and Morris 2017)-and I will focus on the putative pragmatic benefits of believing in free will and 1 See the opening chapter of this volume for a comprehensive summary of optimistic skepticism and disillusionism and how they differ from, say, the illusionism of Saul Smilansky (2000Smilansky ( , 2013. Other skeptics who are optimistic about the implications of life without free will and/or basic desert moral responsibility include Pereboom (2001Pereboom ( , 2013aPereboom ( , 2013bPereboom ( , 2014, Waller (2011Waller ( , 2013Waller ( , 2014b, Levy (2011), andMilam (2016). For a defense of disillusionism, see Nadelhoffer (2011). first asked to read passages by well-respected scientists to the effect that we do not have free will.…”