The Study of National Preference Formation in Times of the Euro Crisis and Beyond

Abstract

The aim of its introduction is threefold: We start from a conceptual clarification of preference formation, defining it provisionally as a political process ‘by which social actors decide what they want and what to pursue’. After an analysis of different conceptual and theoretical approaches, the introduction offers a critique of liberal intergovernmentalism, one of the major explanatory frameworks of preference formation in European Union studies. This critique centres on the context in which national preference formation took place during the European Monetary Union crisis. This special issue argues that the conceptualisation of preference formation as state-based, unidirectional and unchanged by the regime is deeply problematic. Preference formation is typically messy and non-linear and rarely closed to the possibility that both preferences and positions may change, sometimes radically, it is even more complex, context-sensitive, and open to a wide range of influences in a multi-level system such as the European Union. In other words, the traditional understanding of preference formation as a purely domestic process of interest aggregation and competition require revision given the multiple factors that shape preferences in general and in the interdependent policy-making of the European Union in particular.

A matter of preference: Taking sides on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project

“…The polarization on Nord Stream 2 is shaped by preferences that influence the position of EU member states. Preference formation and position taking have long been viewed as two consecutive stages for decision-making in the EU (Kassim, Saurugger, and Puetter 2019). 'Preference formation' refers to the domestic process through which actors decide what they want and what to pursue.…”

Making and breaking coalitions for a more ‘Social Europe’: The path towards the revision of the posted workers directive

“…Furthermore, the article seeks to advance the literature on the drivers of (social) policy change in the EU by drawing attention to the role of member state governments in particular. It departs from the observation that governments’ EU policy preference formation cannot be derived entirely from domestic conditions, that is, conceived as a somehow automatic aggregation of patterns of national interest and political competition, but constitutes an open-ended, context-sensitive process (Kassim et al, 2020). If member state governments are ‘persuadable’ and their positions can shift over time, then the question is ‘to what is this shift owed?’…”

“…This takes us to the dynamics of interactions between member state executives. Relevant here is the broader debate on the evolution of EU politics post-2008, which some see as having engendered the relative decline of supranationalism and the parallel empowerment of executive actors from the member states (Bickerton et al, 2015; Kassim et al, 2020). By virtue of their dual role in the EU polity, at the same time representing their member state in EU institutions and representing the EU in domestic contexts, executives provide a key link between the national and supranational levels of the EU multilevel system of governance (Kriesi et al, 2021: 8; Van Middelaar, 2013).…”

Executive power in European Union politics

“…From the standpoint of shifting responsibility for the negotiation compromise, we expect that the government of a country with an extreme bargaining position involves supranational and external actors (i.e., EU institutions and the governments of other EU member states) in the formation of bargaining positions, which resonates with the findings of the new intergovernmentalism literature (Csehi & Puetter, 2021). Studies on new intergovernmentalism emphasize the importance of other national governments and intergovernmental bodies in preference formation (Bickerton et al., 2015; Kassim et al., 2020). The mechanism of external involvement is expected to prevail when domestic pressure is high.…”