1999
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/15.3.80
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The Swedish banking crisis: roots and consequences

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Cited by 219 publications
(117 citation statements)
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“…Real interest rates were often negative, meaning that access to money was an asset in itself, with demand constantly higher than supply, meaning that such allocation could easily be described as preferential treatment (Sigurjonsson & Mixa, 2011;Jonung, 2008;Englund, 1999). Foreign currency restrictions were the norm in Iceland, with special permissions needed for foreign currency to import, invest or even to cover travelling expenses.…”
Section: The Icelandic Financial System Prior To the 1990mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Real interest rates were often negative, meaning that access to money was an asset in itself, with demand constantly higher than supply, meaning that such allocation could easily be described as preferential treatment (Sigurjonsson & Mixa, 2011;Jonung, 2008;Englund, 1999). Foreign currency restrictions were the norm in Iceland, with special permissions needed for foreign currency to import, invest or even to cover travelling expenses.…”
Section: The Icelandic Financial System Prior To the 1990mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The novelty of this article is the comparative analysis of the Romanian and (1999( -20061998. Before privatization, banks in both countries lacked experience in a new banking "arena".…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The subject is obviously controversial. 14 See eg Honkapohja et al (2008), Englund (1999) and Steigum (2004) for assessments, respectively, for Finland, Sweden, and Norway. quantitative finance constraints, in the Nordic crises seems to be weak.…”
Section: Management Of the Norwegian Banking Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bu ülkelerde krizin başlamasıyla birlikte yeniden yapılandırma dönemi boyunca ortaya çıkan finansal maliyetler GSYİH'ya oran olarak yüzde 3.2 ile yüzde 17 arasında değişmektedir. (Geniş bilgi için bakınız Hoggart vd., 2001;Hoggart, vd., 2005;Englund, 1999) önlemeye yönelik finansal yeniden yapılandırma maliyeti Endonezya, Tayland ve Kore ve Malezya'da GSYİH'nın yüzde 10-45 arasında gerçekleşmiştir (Flood/Marion, 2004: 843). Bankacılık krizlerinin güçlü bankaları dahi kapanmaya zorlaması, politika yapıcılarını genişlemeci para politikası izleme ve kamu fonlarını kullanarak yükümlülüklerini yerine getiremeyen finansal kuruluşlara destek sağlama şeklinde farklı müdahalelere zorlamıştır.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified