2019
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190092399.001.0001
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Taliban at War

Abstract: How does the Taliban wage war? How has its war changed over time? Firstly, the movement’s extraordinary military operation relies on financial backing. This volume analyses such funding. The Taliban’s external sources of support include foreign governments and non-state groups, both of which have affected the Taliban’s military campaigns and internal politics. Secondly, this is the first full-length study of the Taliban to acknowledge and discuss in detail the movement’s polycentric character. Here not only th… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
20
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
3

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 36 publications
(20 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
20
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In 2018, a US official suggested estimating Taliban troop levels is a "fool's errand." 3 Assessing Taliban strength is also complicated by a dearth of credible intelligence about Taliban resources (Giustozzi, 2019). Anticipating what weaponry and force projection the Taliban could deploy in a given fighting season was challenging as the sources of Taliban taxation were varied and difficult to monitor and assess in real time (Buddenberg and Byrd, 2006;Peters, 2009;Mansfield, 2016).…”
Section: C21 Monitoring Relative Capacitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 2018, a US official suggested estimating Taliban troop levels is a "fool's errand." 3 Assessing Taliban strength is also complicated by a dearth of credible intelligence about Taliban resources (Giustozzi, 2019). Anticipating what weaponry and force projection the Taliban could deploy in a given fighting season was challenging as the sources of Taliban taxation were varied and difficult to monitor and assess in real time (Buddenberg and Byrd, 2006;Peters, 2009;Mansfield, 2016).…”
Section: C21 Monitoring Relative Capacitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This must be set against the known splits within the Taliban, for example, the past rivalry between the Quetta and Peshawar leadership councils. 58 The radical and systematic increase in the status and power of the previously lowly and often despised village mullah is in Pashtun terms the most truly revolutionary element in Taliban history. 59 The Taliban has fought against the US and the Kabul state for two decades in the face of casualties that would have shattered the morale and recruitment of almost any other army.…”
Section: The Taliban and Islamic Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Vietnamese communists are the only parallel I can think of -and indeed, the Taliban may have learned the importance of discipline and organisation indirectly from communism. 60 There are provinces in Afghanistan where five Taliban governors in a row have been killed -and yet a new volunteer for the position has always stepped forward. This marks a striking contrast with all previous religiously inspired Pashtun tribal uprisings, which grew rapidly but also collapsed quickly after the first major defeat.…”
Section: The Taliban and Islamic Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In parallel, the increased military pressure of the international forces in South Afghanistan also pushed the Taliban to move a larger part of its assets North. 44 For the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the North was of increased strategic importance by 2008-2009. 45 Because its convoys from Pakistan were severely targeted, the Northern supply route for international troop contributions (through the Central Asian republics) started to attract more attention.…”
Section: Disputed Leadershipmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These phases of recruitment can be observed all over the north: the infiltration of political agents to re-establish contact with old supporters or to identify new ones; the arrival of preachers who invite locals to join jihad; the establishment of small groups of armed men (a mix of returning locals and outsiders) to conduct armed propaganda and the intimidation of hostile elements; and finally, extensive local recruitment and military escalation. 100 Infiltration of Taliban operatives is known to have happened during the upsurge of the Taliban in Kunduz. 101 According to one of my respondents, an undercover Taliban presence existed in Kunduz city even during the times the city was mainly under government control:…”
Section: The Taliban's Strategy In Kunduzmentioning
confidence: 99%