The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols

Meier, Simon; Schmidt, Benedikt; Cremers, Cas; Basin, David

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_48

Cited by 452 publications

(357 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Facts will be used as event annotations in process executions, and also for model checking communication correctness via trace formulas in the following section. Our encoding will rely on the equational theory for pairing, which is embedded in Tamarin prover [14], and includes function symbols , , fst and snd, for pairing and projection of first and second parameters of a pair. Communication within a secure established session is expressed by the manipulation of queues, which will be stored in the set of states S. In SAPIC, we implement queues y pq and y qp as q(y, p, q) and q(y, q, p), respectively, where q is a function symbol for queues.…”

Section: Encoding S Into Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The encoding creates queues for intra-session communication using processes insert (( s ij , ∅)). The security verification uses the builtin library asymmetric-encryption available in Tamarin [14], and assumes the usual signature and equational theory for public keys pk, secret keys sk, asymmetric encryption aenc and decryption dec.…”

Section: Encoding S Into Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rather than defining multiparty session types for A processes, we would like to model checking local types by re-using existing tools for A: SAPIC [12] and Tamarin [14]. Concretely, next we shall connect typability for S processes with satifiability for A processes.…”

Section: Global and Local Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SAPIC and Tamarin [14] consider two sorts: temp and msg. Each variable of sort s will be interpreted in the domain D(s); in particular, we will denote by V temp the set of temporal variables, which is interpreted in the domain D(temp) = Q; also, V msg is the set of message variables, which is interpreted in the domain D(msg) = M. Below, we will adopt a function θ : V → M ∪ Q that maps variables to terms respecting the variable's sorts, that is θ(x : s) ∈ D(s).…”

Section: Definition 1 (Traces Of Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Process specifications in S can now integrate cryptographic operations and be analyzed by (re)using existing methods. In fact, since A processes can be faithfully translated into multiset rewriting rules using SAPIC [12] (which can in turn be fed into the Tamarin prover [14]), our encoding bridges the gap between S processes and toolsets for the analysis of security properties: …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract)

Nantes

Pérez

2018

Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems

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Abstract. Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successful in two research strands: (a) the analysis of security protocols and (b) the enforcement of correct messagepassing programs. Despite their shared foundations, languages and reasoning techniques for (a) and (b) have been separately developed. Here we connect two representative calculi from (a) and (b): we encode a (high-level) π-calculus for multiparty sessions into a (low-level) applied π-calculus for security protocols. We establish the correctness of our encoding, and we show how it enables the integrated analysis of security properties and communication correctness by re-using existing tools.

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Section: Encoding S Into Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Encoding S Into Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Global and Local Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definition 1 (Traces Of Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract)

Nantes

Pérez

2018

Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems

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SIoT identity management with the ability to preserve owner privacy and built‐in resistance to Sybil attacks

Dayyani,

Abbaspour

2024

Concurrency and Computation

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SummaryThe Social Internet of Things (SIoT) allows for more efficient and intelligent communication between entities (humans and objects). Managing the digital identity of objects, protecting the owner's privacy, and resisting impersonation attacks are crucial challenges in SIoT. On the other hand, the classic centralized identity provider servers contain valuable information for hackers and malicious parties. Effective solutions can be presented using decentralized technologies such as blockchains. This paper proposes a decentralized identity management system for SIoT based on smart contract technology. This system drives object identity control; conversely, a zero‐knowledge‐based protocol and double‐spend prevention ideas are proposed for privacy preservation and Sybil attack resistance, respectively. The central idea is to implement self‐sovereign identity (SSI) so that even certifiers are not privy to object‐sensitive information. Additionally, it attempts to prevent the owner from creating Sybil objects using the web of trust method. The method's scalability and convergence can be proven by considering all acknowledgment nodes and different paths. This method was compared with the most novel available methods; the results from this comparison depict the scalability and effectiveness of the proposed method for large networks.

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Security and trust preserving inter‐ and intra‐cloud VM migrations

2020

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This paper focus on providing a secure and trustworthy solution for virtual machine (VM) migration within an existing cloud provider domain, and/or to the other federating cloud providers. The infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) cloud service model is mainly addressed to extend and complement the previous Trusted Computing techniques for secure VM launch and VM migration case. The VM migration solution proposed in this paper uses a Trust_Token based to guarantee that the user VMs can only be migrated and hosted on a trustworthy and/or compliant cloud platforms. The possibility to also check the compliance of the cloud platforms with the pre-defined baseline configurations makes our solution compatible with an existing widely accepted standards-based, security-focused cloud frameworks like FedRAMP. Our proposed solution can be used for both inter-and intra-cloud VM migrations. Different from previous schemes, our solution is not dependent on an active (on-line) trusted third party; that is, the trusted third party only performs the platform certification and is not involved in the actual VM migration process. We use the Tamarin solver to realize a formal security analysis of the proposed migration protocol and show that our protocol is safe under the Dolev-Yao intruder model. Finally, we show how our proposed mechanisms fulfill major security and trust requirements for secure VM migration in cloud environments.

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The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols

Cited by 452 publications

References 14 publications

Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract)

Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness (Extended Abstract)

SIoT identity management with the ability to preserve owner privacy and built‐in resistance to Sybil attacks

Security and trust preserving inter‐ and intra‐cloud VM migrations

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