2011
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifr014
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Tax Treatment of Intergenerational Wealth Transfers

Abstract: This article surveys the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design crucially depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed either in isolation or combined. (JEL codes: H21, H23, H24, E6, D64)

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
10
1

Year Published

2015
2015
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(11 citation statements)
references
References 40 publications
0
10
1
Order By: Relevance
“…(ν = 0), the optimal tax rate remains under 100%. This result differs from previous models, like Cremer and Pestieau (2011), in which fully accidental bequest motives are taxed at a 100% rate. The reason is that the flexibility of the model of PS13 allows for the unconventional case where bequest motives are fully accidental but the bequest elasticity is positive.…”
Section: Variants Of the Benchmark Casecontrasting
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…(ν = 0), the optimal tax rate remains under 100%. This result differs from previous models, like Cremer and Pestieau (2011), in which fully accidental bequest motives are taxed at a 100% rate. The reason is that the flexibility of the model of PS13 allows for the unconventional case where bequest motives are fully accidental but the bequest elasticity is positive.…”
Section: Variants Of the Benchmark Casecontrasting
confidence: 99%
“…However, when the utility of the second generation is included in the social welfare the optimal inheritance tax rate becomes negative to correct for the positive externality caused by joy of giving motives. Cremer and Pestieau (2011) use an overlaping generations model based on Diamond (1965) and extend it to model inheritances, showing how the optimal inheritance tax rate depends on the bequest motives. If bequests are fully accidental, a tax rate of 100% is optimal.…”
Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This timing effect is expected to emerge regardless of the motive, though it is likely to be larger when transfers are altruistically motivated. While the literature contains different views on the impact of wealth transfer taxes on capital accumulation (e.g., Cremer and Pestieau 2011;Piketty and Saez 2013), scholars generally agree that these taxes reduce inequality in wealth and income (e.g., Bossmann, Kleiber, and Wälde 2007;Gale and Slemrod 2001;Hines 2013).…”
Section: Review Of Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, it is important to investigate the strength of the bequest motive in order to better assess the relationship between credit and wealth inequality. In a similar vein, some studies in wealth taxation have pointed out that much more must be done to understand what is the incidence of bequest motives because the responses to estate taxation crucially depend on these motives (Kopczuk (2013), Pestieau and Thibault (2012), Cremer and Pestieau (2011) and Cigno et al (2011)).…”
Section: Insert Figure 1 Herementioning
confidence: 99%