The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program

Abstract

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was created in 1996 from what was previously named the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The TANF program is intended to serve low-income families, primarily those with only a single parent present, as did the AFDC program. The TANF program is distinguished from AFDC by strong work requirements, time limits on receipt, options for the provision of noncash assistance, and by a block grant financing structure. This paper reviews the rules of the TANF program and the research that has been conducted on it and on the AFDC program. financing through block grants, to the individual states; (2) the imposition of strict work requirements in order to qualify for federal aid; and (3) lifetime limits on the number of years of benefit receipt which could be paid out of federal funds. This paper reviews the rules and structure of the TANF program and compares them with the historical AFDC program. In addition, it reviews the caseloads, costs, and participation rates of the TANF and AFDC programs. Finally, it reviews the research that has been conducted on both programs. Given the relative youth of the former, relatively little scholarly research has been conducted on it to date. Consequently, the bulk of the research will be reviewed for the AFDC program. Some discussion will also be provided of the extent to which the results of the AFDC research can be expected to apply to the TANF program.The first section reviews the rules and history of the programs. The second section reviews the trends in caseloads and expenditures and other program characteristics, followed by a section on the research results. A final section discusses reforms of the financial incentives in the program. A short, but more detailed, history of the major developments in the AFDC program can be found in Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986, Chapter 4). That discussion also includes an account of the history of income support programs prior to AFDC. I. History, Rules, and GoalsHistory and Rules of the AFDC Program. Table 1 shows the major pieces of legislation creating and altering the AFDC program over its history, 1935-1996. 1 The program was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 along with the Old-Age Social Security and Unemployment Insurance programs. AFDC provided cash financial support to families with "dependent" children, defined as those who were deprived of the support or care of one natural (i.e., biological) parent by reason of death, disability, or absence from the home, and were under the care of the other parent or another relative. Although the language of the legislation was genderneutral, in practice the vast majority of families of this type consisted of a mother and her children, or what are today called single-mother families. Although the presence of the father was possible if he was the single parent or if he was disabled, the overwhelming majority of participating families were initially, and have continued to be, those where the father is...

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