The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Abstract

Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley's claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley's radical suggestion.Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not really offered an argument for this claim. Instead, he has offered the idea that externalists and internalists are engaged in different projects (the former in the analysis of knowledge, the latter in the theory of epistemic justification) as an ''interesting reading'' (Foley 2001, p. 13) of what many contemporary epistemologists are doing, and as a way of resolving certain standing (and seemingly intractable) debates (see also Foley 2003Foley , 2004. At most, the suggestion can be seen as an inference to the best explanation, given the current state of the discipline.In this paper, I will offer an argument for the strong claim that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge are logically independent projects; in other words, epistemic justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge, and there is independent motivation for why epistemologists should be concerned with developing theories of epistemic justification (call this thesis LIC-the logical independence claim). Or, rather, I want to argue that the

Fading Foundations

“…See Plantinga 1993. 8 That a theory of justification is different from a theory of knowledge has been argued in Booth 2011 andFoley 2012. Alvin Goldman also acknowledges that an interest in justification can have several different motivations, only one of which is an interest in knowledge as such (Goldman 1986, 4).…”

Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT!

“…I will not here access whether or not Williamson indeed succeeds in evading the Sceptic (or whether someone else such as Neta 2011 does)-what I am primarily interested in here is to put together a new (or certainly for some reason underrepresented way) of being an Infallibilist and responding to the Sceptic. 4 For example (inter alia) Bonjour (2003), Booth (2011Booth ( , 2014Foley (2004); Kaplan (1985), Lockie (2014). 5 I'm afraid that 'offensive' is the right word to describe how these philosophers consider this view.…”

Beliefless Knowing

“…For recent argument against knowledge having an anti‐luck condition, see Comesana (), Hetherington (), Baumann (), and Colaco et al (). For a recent rejections of the idea that knowledge requires justification see Foley (), Booth (), and Sylvan ().…”