The Theory of Local Beables

Bell, J. S.

doi:10.1142/9789812795854_0078

Cited by 118 publications

(221 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

221

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Of course the way we use the notion of pragmatic information within the two different types of interpretations is fundamentally different but this mere fact should not force us to prefer one approach (epistemological or ontological) to the other. Bohmian theory "is formulated basically in terms of what Bell [35] has called "beables" rather than of "observables", where "Beable" is the term John Stewart Bell [36] devised to refer to those elements of a theory which are "to be taken seriously, as corresponding to something real" [35] (p. 234). These beables are assumed to have a reality that is independent of being observed or known in any other way.…”

Section: Pragmatic Information: An Ontological Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Maleeh

2014

Information

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aims to introduce a developed reading of Roederer's interpretation of pragmatic information as a good candidate for a Unifying Information Concept required for an as-yet-unavailable Science of Information. According to pragmatic information, information and information processing are exclusive attributes of biological systems related to the very definition of life. I will apply the notion to give new accounts in the following areas: (1) quantum interpretation: based on a modified version of David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics, I propose an ontological, information-based interpretation of quantum mechanics which, unlike Roederer's interpretation, satisfies all conditions of pragmatic information; (2) artificial intelligence: the notion successfully distinguishes natural living systems from artifacts and natural non-living systems, providing a context to pose an information-based argument against the thesis of Strong Artificial Intelligence; (3) phenomenal consciousness: I will use pragmatic information to modify and update Chalmers's Double-aspect Theory of Information to be explanatorily more powerful regarding the physical aspect of his theory; (4) causation: based on pragmatic information, I pose a new account of causation which differentiates causation in biology from causation in natural abiotic world.

show abstract

Section: Pragmatic Information: An Ontological Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Maleeh

2014

Information

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The interpretations of quantum theory can be classified [1] in two types: Those that view quantum probabilities of measurement outcomes as determined by intrinsic (observerindependent) properties of the observed system, for example, Einstein's [2], Bohmian mechanics [3,4], many worlds [5,6], Ballentine's [7], modal interpretations [8,9], Bell's beables [10], collapse theories [11,12], and Spekkens's [13], and those according to which quantum theory does not deal with intrinsic properties of the observed system but with the experiences an observer has of the observed system, for example, Copenhagen [14,15], Wheeler's [16], relational [17,18], Zeilinger's [19], Fuchs and Peres's no interpretation [20], and QBism [21,22]. Here, following Ref.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory

Cabello

Gühne

et al. 2016

Phys. Rev. A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The interpretation of quantum theory is one of the longest-standing debates in physics. Type I interpretations see quantum probabilities as determined by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type II see them as relational experiences between an observer and the system. It is usually believed that a decision between these two options cannot be made simply on purely physical grounds but requires an act of metaphysical judgment. Here we show that, under some assumptions, the problem is decidable using thermodynamics. We prove that type I interpretations are incompatible with the following assumptions: (i) The choice of which measurement is performed can be made randomly and independently of the system under observation, (ii) the system has limited memory, and (iii) Landauer's erasure principle holds.

show abstract

“…In his celebrated theorem, Bell [8][9][10][11][12] considers models of the kind EPR may have had in mind, but he focuses on Bohm's [13] version of the experiment (henceforth, the EPR/B experiment), where the measured quantities are spins in various directions. These models postulate the existence of 'hidden variables' that are supposed to constitute a (more) complete pair's state, and this state is supposed to determine the measurement outcomes or their probabilities in a perfectly local way.…”

Section: Bell's Theorem and Its Common Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following Bell [11], the above analysis of Bell's theorem relies on a principle of causal inference which is similar to Reichenbach's [22] principle of the common cause. That is, it is assumed that non-accidental correlations have causal explanation, and the kind of explanation is as spelled out in (iii) and (iv) above.…”

Section: Fine's Interpretation Of Bell's Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

Berkovitz

2011

Probability in Physics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti's interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti's verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell's theorem.

show abstract

The Theory of Local Beables

Cited by 118 publications

References 6 publications

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Pragmatic Information as a Unifying Biological Concept

Thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About