The Third Shift: The Politics of Representation and the Psychological Turn

Abstract

In the last few years, the situation and experiences of women in academic philosophy-and in academia more broadly-have received unprecedented attention. For feminist philosophers, a growing awareness of the problems facing women in the discipline is something to be welcomed. Nevertheless, this paper raises some serious concerns about the framework within which these problems are analysed and addressed. I suggest that the currently prevalent approach overemphasises issues of representation, and that it has also become preoccupied with psychology at the expense of political and social criticism. no feminist would want to line up with the defenders of a sexist establishment by attacking long-overdue efforts to combat some very real problems. This paper is my response to the dilemma. It is intended as a critique of present theoretical and practical approaches to the issue of women in philosophy. The critique is partly, though not purely, a feminist one. As Black feminists, among others, have long pointed out (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000; cf. Spelman 1988), there is in any case no such thing as a 'purely feminist' position, simply because women exist in societies that are structured by relations of racial and class domination as well as by gender. Women in philosophy, too, live and work in institutions which are shaped and structured by these and other forces. To a large extent, the criticisms I'll make of the current discussion around the issue of women in philosophy may be understood as criticisms of the attempt to treat that issue as an isolated 'woman problem', to be analysed and resolved independently of a broader critique of academic institutions and of the forces that shape them. It is worth confessing now to some qualms about the very decision to write about the issue of 'women in philosophy'. It might be simpler if I could share the view that some philosophers hold of their discipline, whereby it is a rare bastion of incisive and critical thinking, providing a valuable (if underappreciated) service to society; but I cannot honestly share that view. 1 In writing about the situation of women in philosophy, I do not mean to imply otherwise: that is, I do not approach this subject with the guiding idea that academic philosophy is a wonderful thing, so that to deny women equal access to or enjoyment of it is to deny them something precious. 2 Nor do I mean to endow the issue of 'women in philosophy' with any special strategic or global importance: wonderful or not, the field of philosophy is-in the grand scheme of things-quite tiny. I write about it-rather than writing about women in sport, for example-as a matter of personal and local interest, as a woman whose field of study and work is philosophy. Feminists outside the field-and even within it-may feel that they have better things to think about than the plight of women in philosophy (or of women in academia, for that matter). That is fair enough. 1 I don't pretend to be able to vindicate this negative verdict on my own field here, though I have defended it at ...

Theorizing social change

“…But many have also shown how much (especially popular) culture is a major hindrance to social change, produced for commercial ends and serving to entrench the status quo (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1947/1997; Marcuse, 1964). The language and symbols of resistance movements are easily repackaged and made profitable; overemphasis on discourse, culture, and representation can divert energy away from struggles against more concrete political economic structures of domination (C. J. Cohen, 1997; Finlayson, 2018). Fraser's analysis of the “recognition‐redistribution” dilemma puts a particularly fine point on potential tensions between symbolic and material dimensions of change: redistributive mechanisms that highlight group difference can have the unintended effect of stigmatizing these groups as deficient, needy recipients of special treatment, thereby undermining efforts to revalue these identities through recognizing their status as competent and deserving equals 15 .…”

Hitting the barriers – Women in Formula 1 and W series racing

“…There is evidence that sporting institutions are also chasing the 50:50 ratio, with the 2021 Olympics priding itself on being the ‘first ever gender-balanced Olympic Games in history’, due to women making up 49% of participants (International Olympic Committee, 2021). Nonetheless, aiming for such a balance is often a result of the desired ‘role model effect’, where it is intended that ‘the presence of successful women at the top of a profession will inspire others’ in a trickle-down effect and aid the combat of harmful stereotypes (Finlayson, 2018: 780). Despite positive intentions, equal numerical representation ‘neither constitutes nor indicates equality or justice for women’, as it does not give us a metric to understand attitudes towards women – a crucial factor in fighting gender inequality (Finlayson, 2018: 781).…”

“…Nonetheless, aiming for such a balance is often a result of the desired ‘role model effect’, where it is intended that ‘the presence of successful women at the top of a profession will inspire others’ in a trickle-down effect and aid the combat of harmful stereotypes (Finlayson, 2018: 780). Despite positive intentions, equal numerical representation ‘neither constitutes nor indicates equality or justice for women’, as it does not give us a metric to understand attitudes towards women – a crucial factor in fighting gender inequality (Finlayson, 2018: 781). Striving for equal representation opens women up to the problem of tokenism, which could possibly be more detrimental for women’s efforts in motorsport as it can fuel the attitude that women continue to be inferior drivers for their entry into the sport is not merit-based.…”

‘I don’t want to be known for it’: Girls, leadership role models and the problem of representation

“…Media and political attention to this issue has elevated the presence of women in leading roles to be the most prominent of concerns around gender inequalities. Lorna Finlayson (2018) argues that such a focus on representation is problematic in that it is often based on an assumption that having more women in high-profile roles is indicative of greater equality more generally; it can also assume that representation is productive of such equality, through what has been termed 'trickle-down' feminism (Jaffe, 2013), as women with the most powerful roles are assumed to create conditions in which more women will flourish. Such simple counting of women neglects other key relations of domination and exclusion.…”

“…The idea of the inspiring role model and the focus on women in leadership roles are closely entwined as both assume that increased visibility of women in top positions will encourage others to follow suit (Finlayson, 2018). This assumption is not without evidence; the function of role models in the formation of youth aspirations has been explored (Allen and Mendick, 2012;Jackson and Vares, 2016), while the idea of the importance of leadership role models for women has gained traction both in corporate arenas (see, for example, Frazer, 2014;Pereira, 2012) and in management studies (Adamson and Kelan, 2018;Simon and Hoyt, 2013).…”