The Threat of Selective Democracy. Popular Dissatisfaction and Exclusionary Strategy of Elites in East Central and Southeastern Europe

Abstract

The large dissatisfaction of citizens with post-communist democracy in Central and Eastern Europe favors populist and anti-systemic parties and movements. These parties accuse their rivals of various forms of corruption and prescribe anti-systemic cures, including the discretionary exclusion of their rivals from political life. Analyzing the situations in Poland, Romania, and Hungary more closely, we reveal a risk of the development of “selective democracy,” in which key elites and their supporters redefine the borders of the polity in an exclusionary way, denying various groups of “enemies” legitimate access and representation and thereby undermining basic democratic principles.

Creating Suspicion and Vigilance

“…5 Varga and Freyberg-Inan (2012) identify these new systems as 'selective democracies', meaning that governing actors maintain democratic rule on the surface, but nevertheless rely on exclusionary strategies. First, opponents are presented as being excluded from the polity, then democratic rules 'are applied to specific groups within it who have entrenched themselves in power' (Varga and Freyberg-Inan, 2012: 351) Although these theories approach the issue from different angles, they have one element in common: they suggest that in order to succeed, these strong leaders need to control resources more firmly than their colleagues in Westerntype democracies do.…”

“…In social movement studies, resources typically also include legitimation, prestige, networks and supporters. Along these lines, similarly to Varga and Freyberg Inan (2012), we also consider the ability to enter the political discourse and the ability to engage others in political debate as a resource, since it is a precondition of being INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 108-125.…”

EU Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Romania

“…The new amendments also allowed political advertisements only in the publicly run media during election campaigns, included a rule that university students could only get state grants if they pledged to work in Hungary after graduation and fines or prison terms for homeless people who slept on the streets . In the light of these changes, Fidesz constitutes the party of ‘selective democracy’ par excellence as it successfully deepened ‘its hold on power by passing measures that benefit them and block any initiatives for increased transparency and accountability’ (Varga and Freyberg‐Inan, , pp. 353, 358).…”

“…Analytically, this article contributes to the literature on post-accession leverage (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008;Sedelmeier, 2012Sedelmeier, , 2014 and democratic backsliding in the CEECs (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007;Rupnik, 2007;Varga and Freyberg-Inan, 2012) by providing empirical evidence regarding those domestic conditions that can assist the impact of EU-level action concerning democratic violations. The comparison with the Hungarian case highlights that specific factors present in Romania, but lacking in Hungary, enabled the Romanian government's acquiescence to EU demands concerning democratic breaches.…”

“…The EU has encouraged political changes that isolate nationalist and anti‐democratic forces (Pop‐Eleches, ; Schimmelfennig, ). Nevertheless, the recent illiberal turn in the CEECs (Rupnik, , ; Scheppele, ) has raised serious doubts about the democratic consolidation of the new Member States (Varga and Freyberg‐Inan, ) and has brought to the fore the availability of EU leverage to address democratic backsliding in the Member States. Furthermore, the democratic deterioration in these countries has raised pertinent questions not only about the availability of post‐accession leverage to safeguard democratic values in the Union, but also about the key domestic conditions that can render this EU leverage effective in the first place.…”