2014
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9430-7
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The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights

Abstract: We consider the problem of producing an impure public good in various jurisdictions formed through the strategic decisions of agents. Our environment inherits two well-known problems:(i) Under individual decisions, there is a tension between stability and e¢ ciency;(ii) Under coalitional decisions, stable jurisdiction structures may fail to exist.The solution we propose is the use of membership property rights: When a move among jurisdictions is subject to the approval of the agents whom it a¤ects, coalitional… Show more

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