The Time is Now: Proposals for Two Enlistment Incentive Experiments

Abstract

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Level-Loading of Enlisted Accessions

“…11 The evolution of previous research reflects an understanding that modeling the relationship between financial incentives and recruit behavior is a complex process. In fact, some researchers have concluded that the limitations of existing methods are so severe that it is not possible to obtain reliable estimates [9,10]. Rather, they suggest that a more profitable approach would be to conduct an experiment with these incentives in order to accurately measure their effect on recruit behavior.…”

“…11. See [8] for an excellent summary of the earlier literature; reference [9] discusses the more recent literature.…”

“…This is not to say that Navy policies, including targeted enlistment bonuses, have no effect; rather, it points to the possibility that the civilian economy affects the success of the Navy's accession policy. 9 Targeted enlistment bonuses in the Nuclear Field Figure 1 showed the distinct seasonal variation in Nuclear Field accessions; summer accessions are higher than average, while the preceding four months have fewer accessions than the rest of the fiscal year. Policy-makers recognize this variation and, in an attempt to level-load accessions, offer enlistment bonuses that vary by season.…”

“…As figure 3 shows, the seasonal variation in EBs is inversely related to the seasonal variation in accessions in figure 1. During the spring, NF 9. Relatively large military pay raises, a sagging domestic economy, and a renewed sense of patriotism have all been credited with recent increases in retention; conversely, a strong civilian economy lowers retention and makes it more difficult for the Navy to meet accession goals [6].…”

Toward an Understanding of the Role of Incentives in Enlisted Recruiting

“…Therefore, we recommend that the Navy conduct experiments to understand the roles that incentives, personal preferences, and the classification process play in the ultimate selection of rating and ship date. A companion CNA research document offers detailed recommendations for the types of experiments needed [3].…”