1996
DOI: 10.2307/2555928
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The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements

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Cited by 55 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…To study case duration to settlement we use survival analysis (see, e.g., Fournier and Zuehlke 1996, Kessler 1996, Eisenberg and Farber 1997, Spurr 1997, Boyd and Hoffman 2012, Fenn and Rickman 2013, Ayuso et al 2015. Unlike standard regression methods such as ordinary least squares estimation, survival analysis allows us to, first, address the issue of skewed distribution of duration times (see Figure 1); second, mitigate sample selection bias by incorporating pending cases into the estimation; and, third, model the effect of time-varying covariates such as, for example, our indicator variables for consecutive court sessions.…”
Section: Empirical Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To study case duration to settlement we use survival analysis (see, e.g., Fournier and Zuehlke 1996, Kessler 1996, Eisenberg and Farber 1997, Spurr 1997, Boyd and Hoffman 2012, Fenn and Rickman 2013, Ayuso et al 2015. Unlike standard regression methods such as ordinary least squares estimation, survival analysis allows us to, first, address the issue of skewed distribution of duration times (see Figure 1); second, mitigate sample selection bias by incorporating pending cases into the estimation; and, third, model the effect of time-varying covariates such as, for example, our indicator variables for consecutive court sessions.…”
Section: Empirical Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies of the timing of settlement are particularly scarce in the context of civil-law legal systems (see, e.g., Deffains and Doriat 1999, Westeus 2014, Ayuso et al 2015 where the procedural aspects of litigation, and thus the set of rules and incentives shaping settlement decisions, can differ notably from those in common-law legal systems (see, e.g., Kessler 1996, Fournier and Zuehlke 1996, Spurr 1997, Eisenberg and Farber 1997, Boyd and Hoffman 2012, Fenn and Rickmann 2013.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…17 The plaintiff makes all of the offers. 18 In each period, t (with t ≤ T ), the plaintiff makes a offer, s t , which the defendant may either accept or reject. If she rejects, the game continues with the plaintiff making another offer in the following period.…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, assuming time-to-trial is exogenous to the litigants' decision seems to be reasonable. 18 This assumption puts the whole bargaining power on the plaintiff's side, although generally the defendant may make counter offers. This assumption is made to avoid the multiplicity of equilibria associated with updating of beliefs.…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11 See, for example, Danzon and Lillard (1983), Farber and White (1991), Kessler et al (1996), Fournier and Zuehlke (1996), Fenn and Rickman (1999), Viscusi (1988) and the survey by Kessler and Rubinfeld (2004). Sieg (2000) and Watanabe (2005) present structural econometric models of settlement.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%