The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?

Wang, Jiayi; Ping, Lei

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106888

Cited by 79 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…For example, lifelong investigation system for ecological environmental damage in 2015 and the red line of ecological protection, upper limit of pollutant discharge, and bottom line of environmental access in 2016. It means the start of the era with the most stringent environmental protection system (Wang and Lei, 2021). Correspondingly, the environmental performance of the local officials constitutes a hard-adjustment of promotion (Wu and Cao, 2021).…”

Section: Temporal Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is essentially due to the competition between neighboring regions, which originates from dual decentralization, that is, Chinese-style decentralization and environmental decentralization. The former refers to political centralization and economic decentralization (Li and Zhou, 2005;Xu, 2011;Caldeira, 2012;Wang and Lei, 2021), whereas the latter indicates that environmental management in China is based on a territorial management system (Ran et al, 2020;Hao et al, 2021;Li et al, 2021). In this context, the following questions arise: 1) Are there strategic interactions in environmental regulation among cities?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation: Evidence From Spatial Effects Across Chinese Cities

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Developing countries are notorious for their enforcement gap in environmental regulation. Despite policymakers and scholars focusing on this phenomenon in China, there is little literature to explore the cause for its prevalence. This paper aims to explain this occurrence from the perspective of strategic interactions among the local governments in China based on the yardstick competition theory. Employing spatial panel data models, we use a panel dataset of Chinese cities to investigate strategic interactions in environmental regulation and identify their possible sources. The results depict a confirmative picture of strategic interactions in environmental regulation among Chinese cities, suggesting that the cities tend to imitate their neighbours and implement looser environmental regulation in response to the decreasing stringency in neighbouring cities. This transmission effect demonstrates the prevalence of incomplete implementation of environmental regulation. Moreover, the imitative actions vary across Chinese cities, as they are observed in eastern and western cities but not in central cities. In addition, the imitative actions are significantly weaker when environmental governance gains a higher degree of salience, indicating that green performance appraisals reduce strategic interactions among local governments. Finally, strategic interactions are found to originate from the fiscal decentralization system, and are strengthened by the turnover of the municipal party secretary or a younger one.

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Section: Temporal Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation: Evidence From Spatial Effects Across Chinese Cities

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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“…Local government ofcials are an important external factor infuencing the efectiveness of environmental regulations in China [17]. Seeking political promotion can be considered the most critical career incentive for Chinese ofcials [18,19]. In the context of absolute power held by local governments, the promotion incentives and position turnover of government leaders signifcantly impact regional economic, social, and environmental systems.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government-Enterprise Collusion and the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulations: Implications for Public Health

Shu

Peng

Zhou

et al. 2023

Journal of Environmental and Public Health

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Effective environmental management will create a win-win situation for building an ecological civilization with the potential to control the COVID-19 pandemic. From the perspective of government-enterprise collusion (GEC), this study analyzes the moderating effects of the officials’ promotion incentives and turnover on the effectiveness of environmental regulations utilizing a panel dataset on 276 cities in China from 2003 to 2019. The study reveals the following empirical results: First, promotion incentives positively moderate the relationship between environmental regulations and environmental pollution, mainly air pollution; results for water pollution are not significant. Compared with general cities, the positive moderating effect of promotion incentives in high-level cities is weaker and the negative moderating effect is more potent. Additionally, the moderating effect of promotion incentives is predominantly positive in the new developmental stage from 2013 to 2019. Second, the negative moderating effect of officials’ turnover on the effectiveness of environmental regulations is mainly observed for water pollution but not evident for air pollution. Compared with high-level cities, officials’ turnover in general cities is more conducive to the effectiveness of environmental regulations. These findings provide beneficial insights for promoting green growth by improving official governance and destroying GEC.

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“…Conversely, it is defined as a region with a low marketization level. Column (5) and Column (6) of Table 9 report the regression results. In the areas with lower marketization levels, the negative effect of economic growth target constraints on the enterprise technological innovation is more obvious.…”

Section: Plos Onementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The management of economic growth targets is one of the most important ways for the government to regulate macro-economic development and has a major impact on regional resource allocation. In China, there triggers an intensive tournament competition in local government's fiscal expenditure [4,5] and environmental regulation [6,7] because of the strong linkage between the private interests of government officials and regional economic development [8,9]. The tournaments also exit in local government's economic growth target setting, mainly showing that the value of economic growth targets is amplified along with different jurisdiction levels [10,11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of economic growth target constraints on enterprise technological innovation: Evidence from China

Zhang

et al. 2022

PLoS ONE

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By using the data from Chinese listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market for the period 2007 to 2019 and the Report on the Work of the Government, this paper investigates the impact of the local government’s economic growth target constraints on enterprise technological innovation and its mechanism. It is found that the local government’s economic growth target constraints significantly inhibit enterprise technological innovation, which is more obvious in the samples of SOEs, regulated industries, and enterprises at low marketization levels. The change of government officials’ performance appraisal indicators from the quantity to quality of economic growth can alleviate the negative effect. The mechanism effect test indicates that the local government’s economic growth target constraints will aggravate enterprise financing constraints and decrease the contribution of R&D investment to enterprise performance, and further inhibit enterprise technological innovation.

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The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?

Cited by 79 publications

References 45 publications

Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation: Evidence From Spatial Effects Across Chinese Cities

Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation: Evidence From Spatial Effects Across Chinese Cities

Government-Enterprise Collusion and the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulations: Implications for Public Health

Impact of economic growth target constraints on enterprise technological innovation: Evidence from China

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