The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons for Climate Change

Tietenberg, Tom

doi:10.1093/oxrep/19.3.400

Cited by 141 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Where the spatial dimension of resource use or emissions does matter, the EPT system is sometimes combined with spatial limitations to permit trading (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987;Tietenberg, 2003). The RECLAIM programme in the U.S., for example, makes a distinction between two areas (coastal and inland).…”

Section: Comparing Cpt With Eptmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main additional administrative costs are associated with the exchange of NARs between farms. The different opportunities for transfer of concentration rights are controversial (Tietenberg, 2003). Those who are in favour of the free exchange of permits argue that any restriction reduces the efficiency of the system (Tietenberg, 2003).…”

Section: Montgomerymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their main advantage is cost efficiency: a predefined environmental target can be achieved at minimum cost (Baumol and Oates, 1971). Assuming perfect market conditions (this is without transaction costs), the permits will be used by those who attribute the highest value to them (Tietenberg, 2003), regardless of their initial allocation (Montgomery, 1972). Tradable permits are useful when the emissions under consideration have no local impact on environment or population (Lejano and Hirose, 2005), as is the case for greenhouse gases and NO x .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Straeten

Buysse

Nolte

et al. 2011

Ecological Economics

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Concentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood. This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading (CPT) system which can be fine-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration permits. A multi-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of defining the manure problem in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure problem.

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Section: Comparing Cpt With Eptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Montgomerymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Straeten

Buysse

Nolte

et al. 2011

Ecological Economics

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“…Banking can also mitigate the consequences of "overinvestment" by providing extra allowances that may then be used for future compliance (Ellerman et al 2000). Moreover, the temporal flexibility of banking is particularly useful for companies facing large capital expenditures because it provides some flexibility in the timing of those expenditures (Tietenberg 2003).…”

Section: Application Of Risk Management Tools and Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Companies and regulators in emissions trading programs

Kruger¹

2008

Emissions Trading

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Much has been written about the economic and environmental performance of U.S. emissions trading programs for "acid rain" (sulfur dioxide) and nitrogen oxides. Less explored have been the unique roles and interactions of environmental regulators and the companies they regulate. I first examine how these roles change the way that regulators and companies operate within their own organizations and with each other. Next, I use examples from U.S. trading programs to illustrate the design and administrative features that allow program administrators and industry to best fulfill their respective roles. Finally, I examine briefly whether these features are present in the EU Emissions Trading System and determine the implications for its effectiveness.

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“…2 This is largely true of other pollution control instruments as well, although some attention has been devoted to the subject in fisheries management where there may be a greater expectation that regulated entities should bear administrative costs. See Tietenberg (2003) and Schrank, Arnason, and Hannesson (2003) for examples of fees on fishing quota owners for recovering public management costs in several fisheries. 4 pollution sources and the general public can affect social welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?

Stranlund

Chávez

2013

J Regul Econ

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Abstract:All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient, reason for having the public bear part of the cost burden is if aggregate emissions decrease as a result. Abstract: All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient, reason for having the public bear part of the cost burden is if aggregate emissions decrease as a result.

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The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons for Climate Change

Cited by 141 publications

References 46 publications

Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Companies and regulators in emissions trading programs

Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?

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