The Transformation of the US Strategy in the Middle East: Retreat after 2011

Abstract

Since the Cold War, the United States believes in less militarized foreign policy, anchored more on diplomacy, aid, and democracy-building efforts than military intervention. Nonetheless, this belief was largely short-lived after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the September 9/11 attacks on the United States. The United States welcomed hard power, or rather power projection, to those it believed to threaten international peace and stability and homeland security. By 2011, the United States found itself trapped in a region where it can neither transform nor leave due to its interest, allies, and adversaries. The public's cost-benefit analysis established that the US's military intervention in the Middle East was long overdue and resulted in extensive military expenditure. While the United States cannot ignore notable challenges that beset the Middle East region, especially the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Israel's vulnerability, and oil interest, Washington has taken a strategic approach. This paper argues for the retreating role of the US in the Middle East since 2011, with troops withdrawing from conflict areas and sustaining a non-intervention approach. Nonetheless, the United States continues to take a keen interest in five critical factors without resolving power projection: nuclear armament, ensuring the oil trade, fighting terrorism, protecting Israel, and promoting democratization.