In this special issue of Journal of Critical Realism (JCR), I am delighted to present a wideranging collection of papers by imminent critical realists on the subject of normativity. Also included in the collection is a paper by Zachary Wehrwein, an American Pragmatist, who has joined the lively response to Dave Elder-Vass's argument against moral realism. The topic of normativity was chosen because of its role in questions about the future of humanity, possibly influencing whether the human species will survive at all. For instance, without normative acknowledgement of the anthropogenic causes of climate change, it is difficult to take action to reduce carbon emissions. Although Roy Bhaskar's original objective for critical realism was to revindicate ontology, in 2007, he issued a corrective to this, and stated that it is also necessary to consider ontology from the point of view of living in a better world; and that this requires epistemology, since we need to find out what would be necessary to achieve such progress. He therefore argued for an ontology that includes the normative call for social justice. He stated:Although ontology is important, we also have to pay attention to other features of the intellectual landscape, including epistemology and issues to do with judgemental rationality -issues that have been of secondary importance for critical realists until recently. (Bhaskar 2007, 192) The special issue considers how to make the world a better place In discussing normativity's role in achieving social justice, one must assume not only that there is a way of determining, however fallibly and contingently, what a better world might look like, but also that there is a way for this 'concrete utopian' vision to become shared socially, leading to questions of democracy or social consensus. Whilst we have precedents for such achievementstake for example how our factual knowledge about bacteria has led to normative values about cleanliness, or how (it could be argued) humans have advanced their moral position for the better over time in terms of the question of slaverynevertheless there is often disagreement about how we decide what to value, that is, what constitutes the good, and what normative role, if any, this good should play in processes of democracy/ social consensus. Figure 1 refers to the sorts of things that might be discussedand indeed are discussed in this Special Issuewhen considering the idea of normativity.