The Tripartite Evolution Game of Environmental Governance under the Intervention of Central Government

Abstract

Environmental pollution management is about the sustainable development effects of enterprises and the quality of life of people. However, the frequent occurrence of various types of enterprises polluting the environment in recent years has revealed many problems, such as the lack of monitoring by relevant central agencies, the ineffective supervision by local governments, and the failure of public complaints. This paper considers the rent-seeking phenomenon of enterprises in pollution prevention and control, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between enterprises, local governments and central government, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, explores the relationship between the influence of each factor on the strategy choice of the three parties, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system. The results show that there is no evolutionary equilibrium strategy in the current Chinese environmental governance system; the reward and punishment policies of the local government and central government have a guiding effect on the strategy choices of enterprises in a short period of time, but the guiding effect will gradually weaken after a period of time, and cannot completely curb the irregular strategies of enterprises; the dynamic reward scheme can effectively alleviate the fluctuation of the game system and make the strategy choices of enterprises converge to the ideal state.

An evolutionary game study on the collaborative governance of environmental pollution: from the perspective of regulatory capture

“…The studies of Dasgupta et al, which are based on samples of developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, showed that the disclosure of an enterprise's environmental pollution incident by the media exerts an impact on that enterprise's performance in the capital market, thereby inhibiting enterprises' environmental behavior (82). Gupta and Goldar reached similar conclusions based on research in India (83).…”

Tripartite Collaboration among Government, Digital Technology Platform, and Manufacturing Enterprises: Evolutionary Game Model

“…Finally, we will improve the environmental tax incentive mechanism that forces enterprises to go green. The environmental protection tax is an important part of greening the tax system [65]. The environmental protection tax should be introduced as a precursor to gradually adjust the structure of the environmental protection tax system, improve the environmental protection tax system, improve the transparency of taxation, and implement the government penalties along with the government subsidy incentives to help enterprises achieve green upgrading.…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Non-Governmental Organizations Participating in Garbage Management under the Background of Internet of Things

“…Yi Shi et al used evolutionary game theory to analyze the influence of three different environmental regulations on enterprise green science and technology innovation and finally found that combined environmental regulation is beneficial to the development of enterprise technological innovation [34]. According to the rent-seeking phenomenon of enterprises in pollution prevention and control, Zhu et al constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model among enterprises, local governments, and the central government and finally found that the government reward strategy is helpful to the choice of enterprise strategy in an ideal state [35].…”